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Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules
I. INTRODUCTION

Crime victims are virtually absent from the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The sixty federal rules comprehensively cover
every aspect of federal criminal proceedings—from initial appearance
through preliminary hearing, arraignment, acceptance of pleas, trial,
and sentencing. Yet the rules substantively mention victims only
once, briefly recognizing the right of some victims to speak at
sentencing.1
The federal rules can no longer leave victims unmentioned. In
October 2004, Congress passed and President Bush signed into law
the Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna
Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).2 The
CVRA transforms crime victims into participants in the criminal
justice process by (among other things) guaranteeing them notice of
court hearings, the right to attend those hearings, and the
opportunity to testify at appropriate points in the process. These new
victims’ rights will reshape the federal criminal justice system and
force significant changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
to reflect the victim’s expanded role. This Article offers
comprehensive proposals for changing the federal rules to both
implement the CVRA and reflect sound public policy. The CVRA
dictates changes like these to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure because only by integrating victims into the federal rules
will Congress’s goal of making victims participants in the process be
fully realized.
This Article is divided into five parts. Following this
introduction, Part II reviews the current absence of victims from the
federal rules. Surprisingly, even where the rules cover issues of great
concern to victims, victims somehow go unmentioned. Part II then
discusses the crime victims’ rights movement and concludes with a
brief sketch of the events leading to the CVRA’s enactment.

1. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B); discussion infra note 3 and accompanying text.
2. Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2261 (2004) (codified
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005)). The CVRA was part of a much larger
piece of legislation that addressed a variety of subjects, known as the “Justice for All Act.” See
generally Steven J. Twist, On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper,
Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. (forthcoming 2005).
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Part III discusses why it is necessary to amend the federal
criminal rules to incorporate victims. Although the CVRA is a federal
statute that automatically trumps any conflicting procedural rule,
procedural rules drive day-to-day courtroom practices. Given that
Congress was particularly concerned about integrating victims into
the fabric of the criminal justice system, the Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules should amend the rules to directly reflect the CVRA’s
requirements.
Part IV provides a rule-by-rule analysis of the changes needed in
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to implement the CVRA.
Of particular importance is new language protecting crime victims’
rights to be notified of and to be present and heard at public
criminal proceedings. Congress should also implement the right to
notice in a new rule mandating that prosecutors keep victims
apprised of criminal proceedings. In addition, the rules should also
reflect victims’ rights to attend court proceedings and to testify at
bail, plea, and sentencing hearings. Part IV also discusses other
significant changes needed to conform the rules to the CVRA:
defining “victim,” giving victims notice before confidential
information is subpoenaed, allowing victims to be heard before cases
are transferred to remote districts, giving victims access to relevant
parts of the pre-sentence report, permitting courts to appoint
counsel for victims, and protecting the victim’s right to proceedings
free from unreasonable delay. Part V contains a brief conclusion.
II. THE MISSING VICTIMS OF CRIMES
Crime victims are absent from the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Yet this is not because victims lack vital interests in
criminal cases. As the CVRA recognizes, victims have vital concerns
throughout the criminal process. This section recounts the absence
of victims from the federal criminal rules, then contrasts that absence
with the aims of the victims’ rights movement. The movement has
argued successfully before state legislatures and Congress for the
recognition of crime victims’ rights—with these efforts culminating
in the passage of the CVRA, protecting crime victims’ rights in the
federal system.
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A. The Victim’s Absence from the Current Federal Criminal Rules
The sixty Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the
architecture for the entire federal criminal court process, including
initial appearance, preliminary hearing, arraignment, acceptance of
pleas, trial, and sentencing. One would expect that the rules would
frequently mention crime victims, given the subjects—such as bail,
scheduling, and restitution—that directly concern victims. Yet
amazingly, the current rules substantively use the word “victim” only
a single time.
The single direct reference to victims is Rule 32(i)(4)(B), which
directs that before imposing a sentence, “the court must address any
victim of a crime of violence or sexual abuse who is present at
sentencing and must permit the victim to speak or submit any
information about the sentence.”3 The word “victim” appears in
passing in only two other rules: Rule 12.4 requires the government
to disclose to the court any organizational “victim,”4 and the
heading of Rule 38(e) mentions “Restitution” and “Notice to
Victims,” but the text of the rule does not contain the term
“victim.”5
Victims deserve far more than the single reference in Rule 32.
While later parts of this Article work through the rules section-bysection to illustrate where victims have been unfairly ignored,6 a few
examples here will prove the point. The rules currently fail to give
victims any right to be heard regarding whether a judge should
accept a plea, even though the judge must evaluate the public
interest in deciding whether to do so.7 The rules fail to require
notice to victims before their confidential information is subpoenaed
from third parties—such as schools or medical providers—even
though victims have compelling privacy interests to protect.8 And the
rules do not protect the victim’s right to attend trials, despite

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B).
Id. at 12.4(a)(2).
Id. at 38(e) (mentioning “victim” in the heading of the rule).
See discussion infra Part IV.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; discussion infra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17; discussion infra notes 177–91, and accompanying text.
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victims’ long history of having at least some protected interest in
observing trials and other proceedings.9
One provision conveniently encapsulates the surprising absence
of victims from the rules: Rule 32(d)(2)(B). The drafters of this
rule10 appear to have been so afraid to utter the word “victim” that
they did not use the term even when describing the person harmed
by a crime. Rule 32(d)(2)(B) directs that a presentence report
contain “verified information, stated in a nonargumentative style,
that assesses the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact
on any individual against whom the offense has been committed.”11
The phrasing of this provision is striking for several reasons. It
eschews the straightforward term “victim,” preferring instead the
obscuring phrase “individual against whom the offense has been
committed.” The provision also uses the responsibility-obscuring
passive voice in describing the individual “against whom” the offense
has been committed, leaving the reader to wonder who might have
committed that offense (the defendant, perhaps?). Interestingly, the
provision requires that information about the victim be “verified.”
Fair enough—until one realizes that the directly adjacent provision
regarding information about the defendant lacks a similar verification
requirement.12 Why would information about the victim need to be
verified while information about the defendant would not? Finally,
the provision requires that victim information be stated in a
“nonargumentative” style. Again, the adjacent defendant’s provision
contains no such direction.13 In short, even a rule that seemingly
must mention victims—the rule dictating preparation of a
presentence report describing the crime—manages to avoid
mentioning the word.
B. The Victims’ Rights Movement
That victims are missing from the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure exemplifies their treatment in the modern American
9. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43; discussion infra notes 269–300 and accompanying text.
10. To be clear, Congress, not the Advisory Committee on Criminal Law and
Procedure, drafted the language of this rule. See Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 2014 (1984) (directly amending Rule 32).
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 32(d)(2)(A).
13. Id.
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criminal justice system. As one commentator has described the
situation, the victim is “seen at best as ‘the forgotten man’ of the
system and, at wors[t], as being twice victimized, the second time by
the very system to which he has turned for justice.”14 The absence of
victims conflicts with “a public sense of justice keen enough that it
has found voice in a nationwide victims’ rights movement.”15
The crime victims’ rights movement developed in the 1970s
because of a perceived imbalance in the criminal justice system. Led
by feminist and civil rights activists, victims’ advocates argued that
the criminal justice system had become preoccupied with defendants’
rights to the exclusion of crime victims’ legitimate interests.16 These
advocates urged reforms to give more attention to victims’ concerns,
including protecting the victim’s right to be notified of court
hearings, to attend those hearings, and to be heard at appropriate
points in the process.
The victims’ rights movement received considerable impetus
with the publication in 1982 of the Report of the President’s Task
Force on Victims of Crime.17 The Task Force concluded that the
criminal justice system “has lost an essential balance . . . . [T]he
system has deprived the innocent, the honest, and the helpless of its
protection . . . . The victims of crime have been transformed into a
group oppressively burdened by a system designed to protect them.
This oppression must be redressed.”18 The Task Force advocated
14. William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The
Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 650 (1976).
15. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted). See generally DOUGLAS EVAN BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVE
J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 29–37 (2005); Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 517; Douglas Evan
Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L.
REV. 289 [hereinafter Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process]; Paul G. Cassell, Balancing
the Scales of Justice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1380–82; Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the
Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 514 (1982); Erin Ana O’Hara,
Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229 (2005); William T. Pizzi &
Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American
Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37 (1996).
16. See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, at ch. 1; Douglas E.
Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU
L. REV. 255 [hereinafter Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights]; Cassell, supra note
15, at 1381–82.
17. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114 (1982).
18. Id.
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multiple reforms. It recommended that prosecutors assume the
responsibility for keeping victims notified of all court proceedings
and bringing to the court’s attention the victim’s view on such
subjects as bail, plea bargains, sentences, and restitution.19 The Task
Force also urged that courts receive victim impact evidence at
sentencing, order restitution in most cases, and allow victims and
their families to attend trials even if they are also called as witnesses.20
In its most sweeping recommendation, the Task Force proposed a
federal constitutional amendment to protect crime victims. The Task
Force proposed adding to the Sixth Amendment’s protections for
defendants’ rights a provision allowing crime victims to be present
and heard: “Likewise, the victim, in every criminal prosecution shall
have the right to be present and to be heard at all critical stages of
judicial proceedings.”21
In the wake of that recommendation, crime victims’ advocates
considered how best to pursue a federal constitutional amendment
that would protect victims’ rights throughout the country.
Recognizing the difficulty of obtaining the consensus required to
amend the United States Constitution, advocates decided to go to
the states first to pursue state victims’ rights amendments. This
“states-first” strategy 22 met with considerable success. To date, some
thirty states have adopted victims’ rights amendments to their own
state constitutions.23 While these amendments take various forms,
Arizona’s amendment illustrates the types of rights typically
protected. The Arizona constitutional provision gives victims the
broad right to “be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to
19. Id. at 63.
20. Id. at 72–73.
21. Id. at 114.
22. See S. REP. NO. 108-191, at 3 (2004), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.A.N.
23. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12,
28; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16(a); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b);
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b); KAN.
CONST. art. 15, § 15; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25; MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 47; MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 24; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 26(A); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28;
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(2); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 24; N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 37; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10(a); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34; OR. CONST. art. I, §§
42–43; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 35; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A; WASH. CONST. art.
1, § 35; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9(m). These amendments passed with overwhelming popular
support.
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be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse, throughout the
criminal justice process.”24 It also specifically confers a right to “be
present at, and, upon request, to be informed of all criminal
proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present.”25 The
amendment further allows victims to be heard at bail, plea, and
sentencing hearings.26
The movement also successfully prodded the federal system to
recognize victims’ rights. In 1982 Congress passed the first federal
victims’ rights legislation, the Victim and Witness Protection Act
(VWPA).27 The VWPA had three primary goals: (1) to expand and
protect the role of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice
process; (2) to ensure that the federal government used all available
resources to protect and assist victims without infringing defendants’
constitutional rights; and (3) to provide a model for state and local
legislation.28 Since passage of the VWPA, Congress has remained
active in this area of the law, passing several acts further protecting
victims’ rights, such as the Victims of Crime Act of 1984,29 the
Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990,30 the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,31 the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,32 and the Victim Rights
Clarification Act of 1997.33 Other federal statutes have been passed
to deal with specialized victim situations such as child victims and
witnesses.34

24. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(1).
25. Id. § 2.1(A)(3).
26. Id. § 2.1(A)(4).
27. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
28. Id.
29. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
10601–03 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 3013; id. § 3671).
30. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4820 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
10601, 10606–07).
31. Pub L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
32. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
33. Pub. L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3510).
34. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (protecting rights of child victim-witnesses); Pub L. No.
101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990).
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These statutes spawned guidelines for how federal prosecutors
should treat crime victims. The VWPA required the Attorney
General to develop guidelines for the Department of Justice.35 To
implement this Act, the Attorney General developed guidelines
designed to assist victims during the criminal justice process,
mandating protocol, separate waiting areas at court, the prompt
return of the victim’s property, and victim training for law
enforcement personnel.36 The guidelines also directed that
prosecutors notify victims about available services, major case events,
consultations with the prosecutor, and the opportunity for
consultation about the prosecution.37 In 2000, Attorney General
Reno updated and expanded the guidelines. The revised guidelines
heightened the notification requirements, requiring prosecutors and
law enforcement agents to notify victims of important criminal
justice events and to confer with victims about important decisions in
the process.38
Among the federal victims’ statutes, the Victims’ Rights and
Restitution Act of 1990 is noteworthy. This Act purported to create
a comprehensive list of victims’ rights in the federal criminal justice
process. It commanded that “[a] crime victim has the following
rights” and then listed various procedural rights, including the right
to “be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity
and privacy,”39 to “be notified of court proceedings,”40 to “confer
with [the] attorney for the Government in the case,”41 and to attend
court proceedings even if called as a witness.42 The statute also
directed the Justice Department to make “its best efforts” to ensure
35. Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 6(a), 96 Stat. 1248,
1252 (1982).
36. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., ATTORNEY GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE (1995).
37. Id.
38. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., ATTORNEY GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 31–37 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 A.G.
GUIDELINES]. The Guidelines were recently revised. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS
ASSISTANCE (2005) [hereinafter 2005 A.G. GUIDELINES].
39. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(1) (repealed 2004).
40. Id. § 10606(b)(3) (repealed 2004).
41. Id. § 10606(b)(5) (repealed 2004).
42. Id. § 10606(b)(4) (repealed 2004). Testifying victims can attend proceedings unless
the victim’s testimony “would be materially affected” by hearing other testimony at trial. Id.
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that victims’ rights were protected.43 Yet this federal statute never
successfully integrated victims into the federal criminal justice process
and instead became something of a dead letter. Because Congress
passed the CVRA in 2004 to remedy the problems with the 1990
Act, a brief review of the law’s shortcomings is valuable.
Curiously, the 1990 Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act was
codified in Title 42 of the United States Code—the Title dealing
with “Public Health and Welfare.” Such placement effectively limited
the Act’s effectiveness because federal practitioners reflexively consult
Title 18, the Title that covers “Crimes and Criminal Procedure,”44
for guidance on criminal law issues. More prosaically, federal criminal
enactments are bound together in a single West publication entitled
the Federal Criminal Code and Rules. This publication is carried to
court by prosecutors and defense attorneys and is on the desk of
most federal judges. Because West Publishing never included the
Victims’ Rights Act in this book, the statute was essentially unknown
even to experienced judges and attorneys.45
The prime illustration of the ineffectiveness of the Victims’
Rights and Restitution Act comes from the Oklahoma City bombing
case.46 While one might expect victims’ rights would have been fully
protected during such a high profile trial, in fact victims were denied
one fundamental right: the right to observe court proceedings.
During a pretrial motion hearing, the district court sua sponte
precluded any victim who wished to provide victim impact testimony
at sentencing from observing proceedings in the case.47 The court
based its ruling on Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence—the
so-called “Rule on Witnesses.”48 Thirty-five victims and survivors of

43. Id. § 10606(a) (repealed 2004).
44. 18 U.S.C. (2000).
45. Last year, I wrote a letter to West Publishing requesting that they include the law in
their book. That request became moot with the passage of the CVRA, which moved victims’
rights from obscurity in Title 42 to centrality in Title 18, thereby guaranteeing them a spot in
the West publication.
46. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 515–22 (discussing the Oklahoma City
bombing case in greater detail).
47. See United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68, 1996 WL 366268, at *2 (D. Colo.
June 26, 1996).
48. Id. at *2–3 (discussing application of FED. R. EVID. 615).

845

A_CASSELL.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/24/2005 6:31 PM

[2005

the bombing then filed a motion for reconsideration.49 They noted
that the district court apparently had overlooked the Victims’ Rights
Act giving victims the right “to be present at all public court
proceedings related to the offense, unless the court determines that
testimony by the victim would be materially affected if the victim
heard other testimony at trial.”50 The district court denied the
motion for reconsideration.51 It concluded that victims present
during court proceedings would not be able to separate the
“experience of trial” from “the experience of loss from the conduct
in question,” and, thus, their testimony at a sentencing hearing
would be inadmissible.52 Unlike the original ruling, which was
explicitly premised on Rule 615, the later ruling was more
ambiguous, alluding to concerns under the Constitution, the
common law, and the rules of evidence.53
The victims subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit seeking review of
the district court’s ruling.54 Three months later, a Tenth Circuit
panel rejected the victims’ claims.55 The circuit found “a number of
problems with the excluded witnesses’ reliance on the Victims’
Rights Act.”56 Indeed, the circuit found that the Act created no
obligations for courts:

49. Motion of Marsha and Tom Kight et al. and the National Organization for Victim
Assistance Asserting Standing To Raise Rights Under the Victims’ Bill of Rights and Seeking
Leave To File a Brief as Amici Curiae, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1996 WL
570841 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 1996). I represented a number of the victims on this matter on a
pro bono basis, along with able co-counsel Robert Hoyt, Arnon Siegel, and Karan Bhatia of
the Washington, D.C. law firm of Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering, and Sean Kendall of Boulder,
Colorado.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4) (1994) (repealed 2004). The victims also relied on a
similar provision found in the authorization for closed circuit broadcasting of the trial, 42
U.S.C.A. § 10608(a) (West Supp. 1998), and on a First Amendment right of access to public
court proceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980)
(finding First Amendment right of court access).
51. McVeigh, 1996 WL 366268 at *25.
52. Id. at *24.
53. See id.
54. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Kight et al. v. Matsch, No. 96-1484 (10th Cir.
Nov. 6, 1996) (on file with author).
55. United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 328 (10th Cir. 1997), superseded by
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3510.
56. Id. at 334–35.
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The statute charily pledges only the “best efforts” of certain
executive branch personnel to secure the rights listed. The district
court judge, a judicial officer not bound in any way by this pledge,
could not violate the Act. Indeed, the Act’s prescriptions were
satisfied once the government made its arguments against
sequestration—before the district court even ruled.57

Efforts by both the victims and the Department of Justice to obtain a
rehearing were unsuccessful,58 despite the support of separate briefs
urging such a rehearing from forty-nine members of Congress, all six
Attorneys General in the Tenth Circuit, and some of the leading
victims’ groups in the nation.59
In the meantime, the victims, supported by the Oklahoma
Attorney General’s Office, sought remedial legislation in Congress
clearly providing that victims should not have to decide between
testifying at sentencing or watching the trial. A bill was introduced
to provide that watching a trial in a capital case does not constitute
grounds for denying a victim the chance to provide an impact
statement. In a matter of weeks, Congress passed the Victims Rights
Clarification Act of 1997,60 but even that specific statute failed to
protect the bombing victims’ rights. The district court in the
Oklahoma City case found that the statute had constitutional
problems.61
Because of the difficulty accompanying the statutory protection
of victims’ rights, victims advocates decided to press for a federal
constitutional amendment. They argued that the statutory

57. Id. at 335 (internal citation omitted).
58. See Order, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-1469, 1997 WL 128893, at *3 (10th
Cir. Mar. 11, 1997).
59. See Brief for Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation and United States Senator
Don Nickles and 48 Other Members of Congress, United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325
(10th Cir. Feb. 14, 1997) (No. 96-1469); Brief for Amici Curiae States of Oklahoma,
Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming Supporting the Suggestion for
Rehearing and the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc by the Oklahoma City Bombing Victims
and the United States, United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. Feb. 14, 1997)
(No. 96-1469); Brief for Amici Curiae National Victims Center, Mothers Against Drunk
Driving, National Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Network, Justice for Surviving Victims,
Inc., Concerns of Police Survivors, Inc., and Citizens for Law and Order, Inc., in Support of
Rehearing, United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 1997) (No. 961469).
60. Pub. L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12 (1997).
61. See generally Cassell, supra note 46, at 519–20 (recounting problems).
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protections could not sufficiently guarantee victims’ rights. In their
view, such statutes “frequently fail to provide meaningful protection
whenever they come into conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional
indifference, [or] sheer inertia.”62 As the Justice Department
reported:
[E]fforts to secure victims’ rights through means other than a
constitutional amendment have proved less than fully adequate.
Victims’ rights advocates have sought reforms at the state level for
the past [twenty] years, and many states have responded with state
statutes and constitutional provisions that seek to guarantee
victims’ rights. However, these efforts have failed to fully safeguard
victims’ rights. These significant state efforts simply are not
sufficiently consistent, comprehensive, or authoritative to safeguard
victims’ rights.63

To place victims’ rights in the Constitution, victims advocates—
led most prominently by the National Victims Constitutional
Amendment Network64—approached the President and Congress
regarding a federal amendment.65 On April 22, 1996, Senators Kyl
and Feinstein with the backing of President Clinton introduced a
federal victims’ rights amendment.66 The amendment was intended
to “restore, preserve, and protect, as a matter of right for the victims
of violent crimes, the practice of victim participation in the
administration of criminal justice that was the birthright of every
American at the founding of our Nation.”67 A companion resolution
was introduced in the House of Representatives.68 The proposed
amendment embodied seven core principles: (1) the right to notice
of proceedings, (2) the right to be present at the proceedings, (3)
the right to be heard, (4) the right to notice of the defendant’s

62. Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the
Constitution, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B5.
63. Focusing on the Administration of Justice and the Enforcement of Laws: Dep’t of
Justice Oversight Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 23–24 (1997)
(statement of Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. of the United States).
64. See http://www.nvcan.org. See generally Twist, supra note 2.
65. For a comprehensive history of victims’ efforts to pass a constitutional amendment,
see Twist, supra note 2.
66. S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
67. S. REP. NO. 108-191, at 1–2 (2003); see also S. REP. NO. 106-254 (2000).
68. H.R.J. Res. 174, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
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release or escape, (5) the right to restitution, (6) the right to a
speedy trial, and (7) the right to reasonable protection. In a later
resolution, an eighth principle was added: the right to standing to
enforce these rights.69 The 104th Congress did not pass the
amendment.
On January 21, 1997, the opening day of the first session of the
105th Congress, Senators Kyl and Feinstein reintroduced the
victims’ rights amendment.70 A series of hearings were held that year
in both the House and the Senate.71 Kyl and Feinstein reintroduced
the amendment the following year.72 The Senate Judiciary
Committee held hearings73 and passed the proposed amendment out
of committee.74 Yet again, the full Senate did not consider the
amendment.
In 1999, Senators Kyl and Feinstein again proposed the
amendment,75 and on September 30, 1999, the Judiciary Committee
voted, as before, to send the amendment to the full Senate.76 But on
April 27, 2000, after three days of floor debate, the amendment was
shelved when it became clear that its opponents, who objected to
constitutionalizing victims’ rights, possessed the necessary votes to
sustain a filibuster.77 At the same time, hearings on the companion
measure were held in the House.78
Discussions about the Amendment began again soon after the
2000 presidential elections. On April 15, 2002, Senators Kyl and
Feinstein reintroduced the Amendment in the Senate,79 and the
following day, President Bush announced his support.80 On May 1,

69. See S.J. Res. 65, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
70. S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
71. See, e.g., Victims’ Rights Amendment: Hearings Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm.,
105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1997).
72. S.J. Res. 44, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).
73. Victim’s Rights Amendment: Hearings Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 105th
Congress (1998).
74. See 144 CONG. REC. S11,010 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
75. S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
76. 146 CONG. REC. S2966 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2000).
77. See id.
78. H.R.J. Res. 64, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (2002).
79. S.J. Res. 35, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002).
80. 149 CONG. REC. S82 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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2002, a companion measure was proposed in the House.81 On
January 7, 2003, Senators Kyl and Feinstein proposed the
amendment as Senate Judiciary Resolution 1. The Senate Judiciary
Committee held hearings in April of that year,82 followed by a
written report supporting the Amendment.83 Shortly thereafter, a
motion to proceed to consideration of the measure was withdrawn
when proponents determined they did not have the sixty-seven votes
necessary to pass the amendment. After it became clear that the
necessary super-majority votes to amend the Constitution were not
attainable, victims’ advocates turned their attention to enacting a
comprehensive victims’ rights statute.
C. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act
The Crime Victims’ Rights Act ultimately resulted from a
decision by the victims’ movement to seek a more comprehensive
and enforceable federal statute rather than to continue pursuing the
more ambitious goal of a federal constitutional amendment. In April
2004, victims advocates met with Senators Kyl and Feinstein to
decide whether to push yet again for a federal constitutional
amendment. Conceding that the amendment had only majority
support in Congress rather than the necessary super-majority, the
advocates decided to press for a far-reaching federal statute
protecting victims’ rights in the federal criminal justice system.84 In
exchange for backing off from the federal amendment in the short
term, victims’ advocates received near-universal congressional
support for a “broad and encompassing” statutory victims’ bill of
rights.85 This new approach not only established a string of victims’
rights but also provided funding for victims’ legal services and
created remedies for the violation of victims’ rights.86 The victims’

81. H.R.J. Res. 91, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002).
82. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment To Protect Crime Victims: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 1 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Congress, 108–189 (2003).
83. S. REP. NO. 108-191 (2003).
84. See Twist, supra note 2.
85. 150 CONG. REC. S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
86. Id. at S4263 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
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movement is currently evaluating the success of the statute before
deciding whether to continue pushing for a federal amendment.87
The Crime Victims’ Rights Act gives victims “the right to
participate in the system.”88 To facilitate such participation, the Act
grants victims eight specific rights:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused;
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any
public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the
crime or of any release or escape of the accused;
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court
proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing
evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be
materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that
proceeding;
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in
the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole
proceeding;
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
Government in the case;
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law;
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay;
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim’s dignity and privacy.89

Rather than relying merely on the “best efforts” of prosecutors
to vindicate rights, the CVRA also contains specific enforcement

87. Id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see also Att’y Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared
Remarks at the Hoover Inst. Bd. of Overseers Conference (Feb. 28, 2005) (indicating that a
federal victims’ rights amendment remains a priority for President Bush), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/02282005_agremarkshov.htm.
88. 150 CONG. REC. S4263 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). For
a description of victim participation, see Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process, supra
note 15.
89. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
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mechanisms.90 Most importantly, it directly gives victims standing to
assert their rights, addressing a flaw in the earlier enactment.91 The
Act provides that rights can be “assert[ed]” by “[t]he crime victim,
the crime victim’s lawful representative, and the attorney for the
Government.”92 The victim or the government may appeal any
denial of a victim’s right through a writ of mandamus on an
expedited basis.93 The courts are also required to “ensure that the
crime victim is afforded the rights” in the new law.94
These changes were intended to make the victim “an
independent participant in the proceedings.”95 Congress desired to
modify what it viewed as the unfair treatment of crime victims; in
particular, congressional sponsors of the CVRA cited the Oklahoma
City bombing case as the kind of decision that they intended the
new law to overrule.96
III. THE NEED TO PLACE VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN THE RULES
With the CVRA in place as the law of the land, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended to conform to the
statute. While one court has derisively referred to the Act as mere
“mushy, feel good legislation,”97 it in fact substantively changes the
posture of crime victims on a whole host of issues. In the wake of the
Act, victims now must be folded into the process through which
federal courts conduct criminal cases, including bail, plea, trial, and
sentencing hearings. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure—the
“playbook” of the federal courts—should reflect this fact.
Some might agree that victims now have a number of new
rights, but nonetheless dispute the need for a rules amendment.
After all, it might be argued, the CVRA in fact creates substantive
rights for crime victims. Because nothing in the federal procedural

90. Id. § 3771(d).
91. Cf. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights, supra note 16 (identifying the
lack of victim standing as a pervasive flaw in victims’ rights enactments).
92. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(1).
93. Id. § 3771(d)(3).
94. Id. § 3771(b).
95. 150 CONG. REC. S10911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
96. Id. at S4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
97. United States v. Holland, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
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rules can modify substantive rights,98 the CVRA will trump any
conflicting provision in the federal rules.99 In other words, the CVRA
will automatically govern federal criminal proceedings even if the
rules remain as written.
While this argument is legally precise, as a practical matter,
compelling reasons justify amending the federal rules to include
victims. Congress intended that the CVRA’s new rights not be
“simply words on paper,” but rather “meaningful and functional”
reforms.100 To that end, Congress mandated that courts shall
“ensure” that crime victims are “afforded the rights” conveyed by
the CVRA.101 To effectively ensure that victims’ rights are protected,
these rights must become part of the warp and woof of the criminal
process. That can occur only if the federal rules—the day-to-day
operations manual of the courts—spell out how to integrate victims
into the process.
Judges and practitioners frequently refer to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure for guidance as to how to conduct hearings. If
victims’ rights are left out of the federal rules, the strong possibility
exists that courts may mistakenly disregard victims’ rights under the
CVRA. A good illustration comes from Rule 11, which spells out in
some detail how judges should conduct a hearing accepting a plea.
The judge is required to personally inform the defendant of certain
specified rights and ensure that the defendant understands he will be
waiving those rights.102 The judge must also determine that the
defendant is voluntarily entering the plea and that there is a factual
basis for the guilty plea.103 Under the CVRA, victims now also have
the right to be heard before the judge accepts any plea.104 This is a
new right,105 which judges are not accustomed to administering.
Unless the victim’s right to be heard is specifically spelled out in Rule
11’s plea procedures, some judges may inadvertently disregard it.

98. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000).
99. See, e.g., Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002).
100. 150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
101. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
102. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
103. Id. at 11(b)(2), (b)(3).
104. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4).
105. Cf. 42 U.S.C. 10606(b) (listing victims’ rights; right to be heard at pleas not
included) (repealed by 18 U.S.C. § 3771).
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The Oklahoma City bombing case further demonstrates how
courts sometimes blindly follow the federal rules without considering
superseding statutes. In that case, the court excluded victimwitnesses from certain proceedings, relying solely on Federal Rule of
Evidence 615 in making its determination. In denying the witnesses
entrance to the proceedings, the court was apparently unaware of the
provision in the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act protecting a
victim’s right to attend.106 This deficiency was called to the attention
of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence.107 The
committee acknowledged the need to include victims in the evidence
rules and later added a new provision reflecting the victim’s right to
attend.108
One reason for including victims’ rights in the rules is to avoid
litigation about the negative inferences that might be drawn if
victims’ rights are not in the rules. It is a well-settled principle of
statutory construction that expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the other). This
canon of construction applies to the federal rules as much as to
statutes.109 Because the rules repeatedly spell out situations in which
the defendant has the right to have his interests considered but say
nothing about victims, it might be argued that the rules have
implicitly determined that a victim’s interests are irrelevant. To
return to the Rule 11 plea example, given that the criminal rules
specify that a court must address the defendant but lack any
comparable requirement for victims, it might be inferred that victims
cannot speak at plea hearings. Any such conclusion would be
contrary to the plain language of the CVRA.110 To avoid possible
confusion, the rules should be clear on this point.
An additional reason for integrating victims into the federal rules
is that Congress seemingly expects this to happen. Congress adopted
the CVRA with the express goal of making the new law “a formula

106. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
107. See Letter from Paul G. Cassell to Advisory Comm. (on file with author).
108. See FED. R. EVID. 615 advisory committee’s notes (1998 Amendments).
109. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
110. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (Victims have “the right to be . . . heard” at any public
proceeding “involving . . . [a] plea.”).
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for success” and a “model for our States.”111 Congress clearly wants
the new law aggressively implemented, thereby avoiding the need for
further legislative action or even, possibly, a federal constitutional
amendment. Congress is watching to see whether the Judiciary (and
the Executive) will fully and fairly implement this new Act. As
Senator Leahy warned, “Passage of this bill will necessitate careful
oversight of its implementation by Congress.”112
Construing the CVRA to require changes is also appropriate
because the Act is remedial legislation. As the Supreme Court has
instructed, “When Congress uses broad generalized language in a
remedial statute, and that language is not contravened by
authoritative legislative history, a court should interpret the provision
generously so as to effectuate the important congressional goals.”113
The congressional sponsors described the victims’ rights in the
CVRA as “broad rights,”114 the significance of which should not “be
whittled down or marginalized by the courts or the executive
branch. This legislation is meant to correct, not continue, the legacy
of the poor treatment of crime victims in the criminal process.”115
A final reason for amending the rules is that crime victims’
groups are looking for the effective implementation of the CVRA.
They are urging that the federal rules be comprehensively amended
to reflect victims’ rights; indeed, they have even suggested that
Congress should directly amend the federal rules to include victims’
rights.116 The Judiciary would be well advised not to ignore these
lobbying efforts. Victims have proven very effective at advancing
legislation in Congress, particularly where they have legitimate
grievances about how they have been treated.117
Moreover, allowing the initiative for drafting of rules to pass
from the Judiciary to Congress is not ideal. The Advisory Committee
on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure includes many skilled
111. 150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
112. Id. at S4271 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
113. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 279 n.4 (1990) (quoting Cia. Petrolera
Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 428 (1st Cir. 1990)).
114. 150 CONG. REC. S4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
115. Id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
116. Interview with Steve J. Twist, Nat’l Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Network
(March 11, 2005).
117. See supra notes 27–34 and accompanying text (recounting victims’ legislation passed
by Congress).
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members with considerable experience in drafting rules. The
Committee is well aware of the CVRA. Shortly after the passage of
the CVRA, the Committee withdrew a modest victim amendment it
was proposing in anticipation of the need to make more extensive
changes,118 and is already working on proposed amendments to the
rules.119 It is preferable to have victims integrated into the federal
rules through careful drafting by the Committee rather than by the
potentially blunderbuss approach of direct congressional action.
For all these reasons, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
should be comprehensively amended to recognize the interests of
crime victims and thereby to allow victims to be full participants in
the criminal process.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TO IMPLEMENT THE CVRA
With the goal of effectively implementing the CVRA firmly in
mind, the remainder of this Article proposes twenty-eight specific
rule changes for consideration by the Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules. The individual sections that follow first recite a
specific proposed change followed by the rationale for that change as
both a matter of law and of policy. For convenience, this Article
discusses the proposed changes sequentially, beginning with Rule 1.
Rule 1—Definition of “Victim”
The Proposal:
Rule 1 should be amended to include the following definition of
a victim:
“Victim” means a person directly and proximately harmed as a
result of the commission of a federal offense or an offense in the
District of Columbia. In the case of a crime victim who is under 18
years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal
guardians of the crime victim or the representatives of the crime
victim’s estate, family members, or any other persons appointed as

118. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
119. Telephone interview with Judge Susan C. Bucklew, Chair, Adv. Comm. on Fed.
Rules of Criminal Procedure (May 2005).
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suitable by the court, may assume the crime victim’s rights under
these rules, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such
guardian or representative.

The Rationale:
The CVRA directly defines “victim” using this language,120 which
ought to be folded into the rules for convenience. The rules
currently define such terms as “attorney for the government,”
“federal judge,” and “petty offense.”121 “Victim” should likewise be
defined.
A definition is required for a second reason: Rule 32 currently
contains a differing definition of “victim” as “an individual against
whom the defendant committed an offense for which the court will
impose sentence.”122 Because that definition varies from that
mandated by the CVRA, it must be changed. Furthermore, the
CVRA’s definition comes with an interpretative history.123 The
CVRA’s definition of “victim” is taken almost verbatim from the
1996 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA).124 In turn, the
MVRA drew on the 1982 Victim Witness Protection Act (VWPA).125
As a result, the CVRA uses a definition of “victim” that is more than
twenty-two years old and that has not produced major administrative
or definitional problems. Courts will be able to draw from that
history to determine who qualifies as a “victim.”126
120. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(e) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
121. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(b)(1), 1(b)(3), 1(b)(8).
122. Id. at 32(a)(2).
123. See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, at 49–69 (reviewing
different definitions of “victim” for purposes of crime victims’ legislation).
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). For differences from the old law, see Twist, supra
note 2.
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2).
126. See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding that VWPA
limited “victim” to victims of the actual offense of conviction so that district court could not
order restitution on basis of charges that were dropped as part of plea agreement); United
States v. Follet, 269 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a free clinic was not a “victim” of
the defendant’s rape of his niece); Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a bank customer was “victim” of attempted bank robbery under MVRA where
defendant pointed a sawed-off shotgun at the customer and the teller, who were standing only
two feet apart, while demanding money), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 943 (1999); United States v.
Sanga, 967 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that foreign national who conspired to be
brought into United States illegally was still a “victim” of the conspiracy where her smuggler
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Rule 1 also appears to be the best place to include the CVRA’s
language about a “representative” of a victim. This language, too,
draws from the restitution statutes.127
Rule 2—Fairness to Victims in Construction
The Proposal:
Rule 2 should be amended to require fairness to victims in
construing the rules as follows:
These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just
determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in
procedure and fairness in administration to the government,
defendants, and victims, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and
delay.

The Rationale:
The CVRA broadly mandates that victims have the right to “be
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and
privacy.”128 This creates a substantive right to fairness, similar to that
found in various state victims’ rights amendments—including the

threatened her life and forced her to work as live-in maid once she had arrived); United States
v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004) (holding that “victim” in manslaughter
case under MVRA was murdered person himself and not the estate), rev’d on other grounds,
United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005). See generally John F. Wagner, Jr.,
Annotation, Who Is a “Victim,” So as To Be Entitled to Restitution Under Victim and Witness
Protection Act, 108 A.L.R. FED. 828 (2005).
A few new issues will need to be litigated. For example, the Hughey case noted above
conflicts with the views of Senator Jon Kyl, co-sponsor of the CVRA, who explained that the
definition of “victim” in the CVRA is an intentionally broad definition because “all victims of
crime deserve to have their rights protected, whether or not they are the victim of the count
charged.” See 150 CONG. REC. S10,910-01 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
At least one court has suggested that, as a matter of discretion, it is desirable to notify even
victims of uncharged conduct under the CVRA. See United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d
319, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (concluding that, absent reason to think otherwise, any person who
the government asserts has been harmed by a crime or who self-identifies as such qualifies as a
“victim”); cf. In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 561 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding
that the CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals not convicted of a crime,
but the government can attempt to obtain voluntary restitution from such persons).
127. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a) (same definition of victim “representative”).
128. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
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amendment found in Senator Kyl’s home state of Arizona.129 This
broad reading was explained by Senator Kyl, who, along with
Senators Feinstein and Hatch, was the primary legislative sponsor of
the CVRA: “The broad rights articulated in this section are meant to
be rights themselves and are not intended to just be aspirational.
One of these rights is the right to be treated with fairness. Of course,
fairness includes the notion of due process.”130
In light of victims’ new substantive right to fairness, Rule 2
should be amended to make clear that all of the rules must be
construed to be fair to victims no less than to the government and
defendants.
(New) Rule 10.1—Notice of Proceedings for Victims
The Proposal:
A new Rule 10.1 should be added to guarantee victims their
right to notice of proceedings as follows:
Rule 10.1 Notice to Victims.
(a) Identification of Victim. During the prosecution of a case, the
attorney for the government shall, at the earliest reasonable
opportunity, identify the victims of the crime.

129. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2(A)(1) (victim’s right “to be treated with fairness,
respect, and dignity”); see also ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (victim’s right “to be treated with
dignity, respect, and fairness during all phases of the criminal and juvenile justice process”);
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (victim’s right “[t]o be treated with fairness, respect, dignity and
privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (victims “to be
treated with fairness and respect for their dignity”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (victims “to be
treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
process”); N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 22 (victim’s right to “be treated with fairness, compassion and
respect by the criminal justice system”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24 (the “right to be treated
with fairness and respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
process”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a (victims “shall be accorded fairness, dignity, and respect
in the criminal justice process”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (“right to be treated with
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
process”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1)(a) (victim’s right to be “treated with fairness, respect,
and dignity”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (victim’s right to be treated with “fairness, dignity and
respect for their privacy”). See generally Cassell, supra note 15, at 1387–88 (discussing victims’
right to fairness in Utah).
130. 150 CONG. REC. 4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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(b) Notice of Case Events. During the prosecution of a crime, the
attorney for the government shall make reasonable efforts to
provide victims the earliest possible notice of:
(1) The scheduling, including scheduling changes and/or
continuances, of each court proceeding that the victim is either
required to attend or entitled to attend;
(2) The release or detention status of a defendant or suspected
offender;
(3) The filing of charges against a defendant, or the proposed
dismissal of all charges, including the placement of the
defendant in a pretrial diversion program and the conditions
thereon;
(4) The right to make a statement about pretrial release of the
defendant;
(5) The victim’s right to make a statement about acceptance of
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere;
(6) The victim’s right to attend public proceedings;
(7) If the defendant is convicted, the date and place set for
sentencing and the victim’s right to address the court at
sentencing; and
(8) After the defendant is sentenced, the sentence imposed and
the availability of the Bureau of Prisons notification program,
which shall provide the date, if any, on which the offender will
be eligible for parole or supervised release.
(c) Multiple Victims. The attorney for the government shall
advise the court if the attorney believes that the number of victims
makes it impracticable to provide personal notice to each victim. If
the court finds that the number of victims makes it impracticable to
give personal notice to each victim desiring to receive notice, the
court shall fashion a reasonable procedure calculated to give
reasonable notice under the circumstances.

The Rationale:
This proposed change stems from the CVRA’s requirement that
victims have the “right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of
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any public court proceeding . . . involving the crime.”131 Senator
Feinstein explained the importance of giving victims notice:
Victims are the persons who are directly harmed by
the crime and they have a stake in the criminal
process because of that harm. Their lives are
significantly altered by the crime and they have to live
with the consequences for the rest of their lives. To
deny them the opportunity to know of and be
present at proceedings is counter to the fundamental
principles of this country. It is simply wrong.132
Under the CVRA, then, victims of the crime allegedly
committed by the defendant133 are entitled to notice of court
proceedings. The tricky issue is who should provide that notice to
victims. This responsibility must fall on prosecutors and their
investigative agents for several reasons. First, prosecutors and their
agents are the only parties who know the identity of the victims at
the outset of the case. After a bank robbery, for example, it is the
FBI agents who respond and interview the tellers. Second,
prosecutors and their agents continue dealing with victims
throughout the course of a prosecution. They work with victims in
investigating the crime, identifying potential defendants, preparing
the indictment, and presenting evidence to the grand jury and at
trial. Because of this working relationship, prosecutors are best
situated to provide notice in most cases. Third, most crime victims
lack legal counsel and are unfamiliar with federal criminal
proceedings. They may need assistance from someone familiar with
the process to understand what is happening. United States
Attorneys’ offices, including the victim-witness components in those
offices, are well situated to provide that assistance. As the President’s
131. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(2).
132. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see
also id. at S4267 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“It does not make sense to enact victims’ rights that
are rendered useless because the victim never knew of the proceeding at which the right had to
be asserted.”).
133. See United States v. Guevara-Toloso, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9762 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (noting that CVRA requires notice to victims of the crime charged against the
defendant but not notice to victims of any previous crimes the defendant may have
committed).
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Task Force of Victims of Crime concluded, the prosecutor is “in the
best position to explain to victims the legal significance of various
motions and proceedings.”134 For all these reasons, prosecutors
should notify victims of their rights and of upcoming hearings.135
Most states that have addressed the issue follow this approach.136
The Justice Department appears to agree that it should notify
victims. In the 2000 Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and
Witness Assistance, the Department required prosecutors and their

134. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 64 (1982).
135. But cf. United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(concluding that, in the absence of a national rule requiring prosecutors to provide notice to
victims, the court would direct the prosecutor to provide the name and contact information of
each victim so that the court can ensure that notice is properly given).
136. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-62(8) (2000) (requiring law enforcement officers to
give victims initial description of their rights and “[t]he name and telephone number of the
office of the prosecuting attorney to contact for further information”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 134409 (2001) (requiring prosecutor to provide notice to victim of criminal proceedings; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-286e (2000) (requiring prosecutor to notify victim of any judicial
proceedings related to the case); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9411 (2001) (requiring Attorney
General to provide information to victim including “[n]otice of the scheduling of court
proceedings and changes including trial date, case review and sentencing hearings”); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-17-8(b) (2004) (requiring prosecutor where possible to give victim “prompt
advance notification of any scheduled court proceedings”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.500.5
(LexisNexis 1992) (requiring prosecutor to provide victim “prompt notification, if possible, of
judicial proceedings relating to the case”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 6101 (2003)
(requiring prosecutor to provide victims of certain crimes notice of any plea agreement and of
trial date); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B, § 3 (West 2004) (requiring prosecutor to give
victims notice of various rights); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §780.755(1) (West 1998)
(requiring prosecutor to give victims notice of court proceedings); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611A.03 (West 2003) (requiring prosecutor to give victim notice of plea agreement and
sentencing hearing); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-9(B) (LexisNexis 2004) (requiring prosecutor
to provide victim with notice of scheduled court proceedings); N.Y. [Executive] LAW. § 646a
(McKinney 2005) (requiring prosecutor to provide notice of court proceedings); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28C-1 (2004) (requiring prosecutor to notify victim of certain
hearings); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-103 (2003) (requiring prosecutor to notify victim of
“times, dates, and locations of all pertinent stages in the proceedings”); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 56.08(b) (Vernon 2004) (requiring prosecutor to give victim notice of court
proceedings); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-3 (2004) (requiring prosecutor to give victim notice
of “important criminal justice hearings”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.14(2m) (West 1998)
(“Before pronouncing sentence, the court shall inquire of the district attorney whether he or
she has complied with § 971.095(2) and with sub. (3)(b), whether any of the victims of a
crime considered at sentencing requested notice of the date, time and place of the sentencing
hearing and, if so, whether the district attorney provided to the victim notice of the date, time
and place of the sentencing hearing.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-204(b)(i) (2004) (requiring
prosecutor to inform victim about all hearings). But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.06(C)
(2005) (requiring court to give notice to victim of court proceedings).
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agents to provide notice to crime victims. In particular, the
Guidelines currently obligate prosecutors to provide victims with
“the earliest possible notice” of:
(a) The release or detention status of an offender or suspected
offender . . . .
(b) The filing of charges against a suspected offender, or the
proposed dismissal of all charges . . . .
(c) The scheduling, including scheduling changes and/or
continuances, of each court proceeding that the victim or witness is
either required to attend or entitled to attend . . . .
(d) The acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the
rendering of a verdict after trial . . . .
(e) If the offender is convicted, the date set for sentencing, the
sentence imposed . . . .137

To avoid creating only significant new responsibilities for prosecutors
and their agents, the proposed new Rule 10.1 is lifted essentially
verbatim from the 2000 Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and
Witness Assistance. The 2005 revisions to the Guidelines continue
essentially the same requirements.138
The drafters of the CVRA also appear to believe that the
notification obligations will fall primarily on prosecutors’ offices, as
the CVRA authorizes an appropriation of $22,000,000 over the next
five fiscal years to the Office for Victims of Crime of the Department
of Justice for enhancement of victim notification systems.139

137. See 2000 A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 38; see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
VICTIMS OF CRIME, NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND
SERVICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 82 (1998) (“Prosecutors’ offices should notify victims in a
timely manner” of all significant hearings.).
138. See 2005 A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 27–29 (providing for notice to
victims, although relying on the department’s Victim Notification Systems (VNS) to do this).
139. See 118 Stat. 2260, 2264 (2004); see also 150 CONG. REC. S4267 (daily ed. Apr.
22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[W]e authorized an appropriation of funds to assure . . .
that moneys would be made available to enhance the victim notification system, managed by
the Department of Justice’s Office for Victims of Crime, and the resources additionally to develop
state-of-the-art systems for notifying crime victims of important statements of development)
(emphasis added). But cf. id. (discussing court notification of attorneys of record and
FOR
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Presumably, those enhanced new notification systems can be used to
keep victims apprised of court proceedings. Moreover, the CVRA
directs that the Department of Justice and its investigative agencies
“shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of,
and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).”140
Proposed new Rule 10.1 adds only two new obligations beyond
those found in the 2000 Attorney General Guidelines: (1) notice to
victims of their right to make a statement regarding any proposed
plea, and (2) notice to victims of their right to attend public
proceedings. Both of these obligations are currently found in the
2005 Guidelines.141
One last issue deserves brief discussion: Is it proper for the
Judiciary, through the rule-making process, to command another
branch of government to take certain actions?142 The starting point
for analyzing this question is the congressional command in the
CVRA that the executive branch must protect victims’ rights.143
Consequently, implementing these rights through rule changes
presents no question of the courts inventing new rights or exercising
some kind of “supervisory” power over federal agents.144 Instead, the
implementation is simply enforcing congressionally created rights
through the Judiciary’s congressionally authorized rulemaking
authority—an uncontroversial exercise of judicial power.145
Moreover, in the CVRA, Congress commanded the courts to
“ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described [in the
CVRA].”146 Rule changes needed to implement the CVRA thus rest
concluding “it is a relatively simple matter to add another name and telephone number or
address to that list”).
140. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(c)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
141. See 2005 A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 27 (prosecutors to notify victims of
all their rights under the CVRA).
142. Victims cannot rely on the provisions of the Attorney General Guidelines to protect
their rights because the Guidelines themselves state that they “are not intended to . . . and may
not be relied upon to create any rights . . . enforceable at law by any person in a matter civil or
criminal.” 2005 A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 27.
143. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(c)(1).
144. Cf. Sarah Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1433 (1984) (discussing more problematic applications of judicial power).
145. See id. at 1476–77; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2072 (establishing court rule-making
power).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b) (emphasis added).

864

A_CASSELL.FIN

835]

10/24/2005 6:31 PM

Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules

on this statutory authority as well. Additionally, this Article’s
proposals affecting prosecutors are closely connected to court
proceedings; they deal with such things as prosecutors notifying
victims of hearings and conferring with victims in anticipation
thereof. It is difficult to see new separation of powers concerns
arising in such contexts so closely connected to the courtroom.
Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure already
direct executive branch actions less directly connected to court
hearings. For instance, Rule 16 directs that prosecutors must turn
over various discoverable items to the defendant.147 Rule 41 directs
federal agents serving a warrant to leave a copy for the person whose
premises are searched.148 And, most controversially, Rule 5 directs
that federal agents making an arrest “must take the defendant
without unnecessary delay” before a judicial officer.149 The kinds of
rule changes discussed in this Article are far less invasive than these
commands. Finally, it should be remembered that federal
prosecutors serve as “officers of the court.”150 In that capacity, the
court can be reasonably expected to facilitate victims’ involvement in
the criminal justice process.151 For all of these reasons, this proposed
rule breaks no new ground in directing prosecutors to notify victims
of courtroom proceedings.
Rule 11(a)(3)—Victims’ Views on Nolo Contendere Pleas
The Proposal:
Rule 11’s procedures on pleas should be revised to allow victims
to express their views on any plea of nolo contendere before the court
decides whether to accept it as follows:

147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1).
148. Id. at 41(f)(3).
149. Id. at 5(a)(1). See generally, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATT’Y GEN.
ON THE JUDICIARY’S USE OF SUPERVISORY POWER TO CONTROL LAW ENFORCEMENT
ACTION (Dec. 15, 1986), reprinted in 22 MICH. J.L. & REFORM 773 (1989).
150. See United States v. Sells Eng., Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 466 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
151. See, e.g., State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002), discussed infra notes 163–66
and accompanying text.
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(a)(3) Nolo Contendere Plea. Before accepting a plea of nolo
contendere, the court must consider the parties’ and victims’ views
and the public interest in the effective administration of justice.

The Rationale:
As discussed at greater length in the immediately following
sections, the CVRA gives victims the right to be heard regarding any
plea, presumably including any nolo contendere plea. It is a natural
corollary that the court should consider the victim’s views before
accepting any such plea.
Rule 11(b)(4)—Victims’ Right To Be Heard on Pleas
The Proposal:
The court should address any victim present in court when
taking a plea in order to determine whether the victim wishes to
make a statement and to consider the victim’s view before accepting
a plea as follows:
(4) Victims’ Views. Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere or allows any plea to be withdrawn, the court must
address any victim who is present personally in open court. During
this address, the court must determine whether the victim wishes to
present views regarding the proposed plea or withdrawal and, if so,
what those views are. The court shall consider the victim’s views in
acting on the proposed plea or withdrawal.

The Rationale:
The CVRA gives victims the right “to be reasonably heard at any
152
public proceeding in the district court involving . . . [a] plea.”
Many states afford victims similar rights.153 The rationale for a

152. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005); see In re Kari Ann Jacobsen,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting victim’s right to be heard on pleas).
153. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (giving victim right to be heard and to object to
plea agreement); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 32 (giving victim right to be heard at plea hearing);
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1)(b) (giving victim the “right to be heard at important criminal
justice hearings related to the victim”); ALA. CODE § 15-23-71 (2000) (giving victim right to
be present at plea hearing and requiring prosecutor to confer with victim about plea); ARIZ.
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victim’s right to be heard regarding a plea is to provide the judge
with as much information as possible. The court is under no
obligation to accept a plea proposed by the parties.154 After hearing
from the victim about the plea, the court can determine what weight
to give to the victim’s views.155
To implement the victim’s right to be heard regarding a plea, the
proposed rule change requires the court to directly address any
victim present in court. This is consistent with the CVRA’s legislative
history that explains that “[t]his provision is intended to allow crime
victims to directly address the court in person.”156 The language of
the proposed rule is lifted from an earlier paragraph in Rule 11,
which requires the court to “address the defendant personally in
open court” “before accepting a plea of guilty.”157 Victims should be
treated even-handedly. It may be important for the judge to address
victims directly because many victims will lack the assistance of
counsel. As novices in legal proceedings, victims may be uncertain
about exactly when in the process they should present their views. By
addressing victims, the court will eliminate that uncertainty and
ensure that the victim’s right to be heard is vindicated.

REV. STAT. § 13-4423 (2001) (giving victim right to be present and heard at plea hearing and
requiring prosecutor to confer with victim about plea); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.03 (West
2003) (giving victim right to be heard at plea hearing); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-33 (2000)
(giving victim right to make statement at plea hearing); N.H. REV. STAT. § 21-M:8-k (2000)
(giving victim right to be heard at plea hearing); R.I. STAT. § 12-28-4.1 (2000) (giving victim
right to make statement at plea hearing). See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note
15, at 476–94 (discussing victims and pleas); Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea
Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (1987).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
155. But cf. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS 252, 257–58 (1995) (proposing that victims have a veto over any plea);
Bennett L. Gershman, Crimes Against Victims: The Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (discussing situations in which victims have effectively
been given a veto over pleas); Karen L. Kennard, Comment, The Victim’s Veto: A Way To
Increase Victim Impact on Criminal Case Dispositions, 77 CAL. L. REV. 417, 437 (1989)
(advocating that victims be given a veto over any plea).
156. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
157. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
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Rule 11(c)(1)—Prosecution To Consider Victims’ Views on Pleas
The Proposal:
The prosecution should be required to consider the victims’
views in developing any proposed plea arrangement as follows:
(1) In General. An attorney for the government and the
defendant’s attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may
discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate
in these discussions. The attorney for the government shall make
reasonable efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider the
victims’ views about, any proposed plea negotiations. If the
defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to either a charged
offense or a lesser or related offense, the plea agreement may
specify that an attorney for the government will . . . .

The Rationale:
The proposed change requires prosecutors to make reasonable
efforts to notify victims about possible plea bargains and to consider
the victim’s views regarding those pleas. This requirement is taken
essentially verbatim from the Attorney General Guidelines for Victim
and Witness Assistance, which direct prosecutors to “make reasonable
efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider victims’ views
about, prospective plea negotiations.”158 Twenty-nine states already
require prosecutors to “consult with” or “obtain the views of”
victims at the plea agreement stage.159
The proposed rule helps to implement not only a victim’s right
to be heard at plea proceedings but also the right to “confer with the
attorney for the Government.”160 Given that victims have the right
to confer, the conferring should take place at the most salient points
in the process. As Senator Feinstein explained, “This right [to
confer] is intended to be expansive. For example, the victim has the

158. 2005 A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 30 (defining what can be considered in
determining whether notice is reasonable in a particular case); see also OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIME, supra note 137, at 75 (“Prosecutors should make every effort . . . to consult with the
victim on the terms of any negotiated plea . . . .”).
159. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 137, at 75.
160. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
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right to confer with the Government concerning any critical stage or
disposition of the case.”161 Because the overwhelming majority of
federal criminal cases are resolved by a plea, a conference between
the victim and the prosecutor regarding the plea will be critical in
most cases. Reflecting that fact, the rules should follow the approach
taken by the majority of states, directing prosecutors to consult with
victims about pleas.
Rule 11(c)(2)—Court To Be Advised of Victim Objections to Plea
The Proposal:
Prosecutors (and victims’ attorneys) should be required to advise
the court whenever they are aware that the victim objects to a
proposed plea agreement as follows:
(2) Disclosing a Plea Agreement. The parties must disclose the
plea agreement in open court when the plea is offered, unless the
court for good cause allows the parties to disclose the plea
agreement in camera. When a plea is presented in open court, the
attorney for the government or the attorney for any victim shall
advise the court when the attorney is aware that the victim has any
objection to the proposed plea agreement.

The Rationale:
When an attorney for the victim or for the government is aware
that a victim objects to a plea, that information should be relayed to
the court. In those rare cases where the victim has an attorney, the
attorney will obviously raise the victim’s objection. The proposed
rule change clarifies the prosecutor’s corresponding and equal
obligation to communicate this information to the court.
The CVRA appears to obligate prosecutors to relay a victim’s
objection to the court, commanding them to use their “best efforts”
to enforce victims’ rights.162 Part of those “best efforts” would seem
to be conveying objections to the court. Victims are often untrained
in the law and unexpectedly thrust into criminal proceedings; they
may well believe that prosecutors automatically relay to the court
161. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
162. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(c).
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their objections to the plea. The proposed rule avoids such confusion
by requiring the prosecutor to notify the court of a victim’s concern.
The rule is limited to situations where the prosecutor is aware of an
objection.
This approach is consistent with the instructive case of State v.
Casey,163 which considered whether a victim’s objection to a plea
made to a prosecutor was sufficient to trigger the victim’s right to be
heard under the Utah Constitution.164 In Casey, the victim told the
prosecutor that she opposed a plea arrangement. The prosecutor
refused to convey the victim’s concern to the court, and the trial
judge accepted the plea. The victim then obtained legal counsel and
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, urging that under the Utah
Victims’ Rights Amendment, her right to be heard regarding a plea
had been violated. The State responded that the victim was obligated
to ask the trial court directly to be heard rather than relying on the
prosecutor to pass that information along. In rejecting the State’s
argument, the Utah Supreme Court explained that prosecutors, no
less than other actors in the criminal justice system, were required to
assist victims throughout the process.165 More important for present
purposes, the court also concluded that prosecutors had ethical
obligations as officers of the court to convey that information to the
judge:
Prosecutors must convey such requests [to be heard] because they
are obligated to alert the court when they know that the court lacks
relevant information. This duty, which is incumbent upon all
attorneys, is magnified for prosecutors because, as our case law has
repeatedly noted, prosecutors have unique responsibilities. . . . The
prosecutor is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
. . . but that justice shall be done.166

Applying the reasoning of Casey to analogous rights in the
CVRA, federal prosecutors must, as officers of the court, convey a

163.
164.
165.
166.
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44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002). I represented the victim in this case.
See generally Nicole G. Farrell, Recent Case Development, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 716.
Casey, 44 P.3d at 763.
Id. at 764 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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victim’s request to be heard regarding a plea. Indeed, the prosecutor
should convey not only the request to be heard but also the fact that
the victim objects to the plea. In deciding whether to accept a plea,
the court must consider the public interest.167 As the Tenth Circuit
has explained, “‘Rule 11 also contemplates the rejection of a
negotiated plea when the district court believes that bargain is too
lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.’”168 When the
prosecutor is aware of an objection from a keenly interested member
of the public—the victim—the court should not be left in the dark
about it.
An alternative way of drafting the rule is to require courts to
inquire of prosecutors whether the victim has been advised of the
proposed plea and whether the victim wishes to make a statement
concerning it.169 For example, Oregon requires the court to ask the
prosecutor whether the victim has been consulted about a plea and,
if so, what the victim’s view is:
Before the judge accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, the judge
shall ask the district attorney if the victim requested to be notified
and consulted regarding plea discussions. If the victim has made
such a request, the judge shall ask the district attorney if the victim
agrees or disagrees with the plea discussions and agreement and the
victim’s reasons for agreement or disagreement.170

South Dakota law contains a similar requirement that prosecutors
disclose “any comments” by the victim about the plea.171 Texas law
requires the court to ask the prosecutor whether a victim impact
statement has been submitted;172 if so, the court must review that

167. See, e.g., United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
168. United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983)).
169. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 137, at 108 (“Judges should
facilitate the input of crime victims into plea agreements . . . and they should request that
prosecuting attorneys demonstrate that reasonable efforts were made to confer with the
victim.”).
170. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.406(1)(b) (2003).
171. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-7-9 (2004) (“The prosecuting attorney shall disclose
on the record any comments on the plea agreement made by the victim, or his designee, of the
defendant’s crime to the prosecuting attorney.”).
172. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(e) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (“Before
accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall inquire as to whether a
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statement.173 Finally, before an Arizona court accepts a plea, the
prosecutor must advise the court that reasonable efforts were made
to confer with the victim about the plea and the victim’s view
regarding it.174
The rule proposed here is narrower than these state formulations:
it requires only that a prosecutor confer with the victim about the
plea and inform the court if the victim objects. For many significant
categories of federal cases (e.g., typical drug trafficking offenses,
felons in possession of a firearm, etc.), there will be no victim, much
less a victim objection. In such cases, to require some sort of victim
inquiry by the court or victim certification by the prosecutor would
unnecessarily waste time. The proposed rule requires only that the
prosecutor report a victim’s objection—in which case the court will
presumably want to more carefully consider whether to accept a plea.
Rule 12.1—Victim Addresses and Phone Numbers
Not Disclosed for Alibi Purposes
The Proposal:
The Government currently must disclose the address and
telephone numbers of any witnesses, including the victim, that it
plans to use to disprove an alibi. This rule should be changed to
protect the victim’s privacy, excluding their information from this
requirement.
(b) Disclosing Government Witnesses.
(1) Disclosure. If the defendant serves a Rule 12.1(a)(2) notice
[regarding intent to present an alibi defense], an attorney for
the government must disclose in writing to the defendant or
the defendant’s attorney:
(A) the name, address, and telephone number of each
witness and the address and telephone number of each
witness (other than a victim) that the government intends

victim impact statement has been returned to the attorney representing the state and ask for a
copy of the statement if one has been returned.”).
173. See id.
174. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4423(b)(1) (2001).
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to rely on to establish the defendant’s presence at the scene
of the alleged offense; and
(B) each government rebuttal witness to the defendant’s
alibi defense
....

(c) Continuing Duty to Disclose. Both an attorney for the
government and the defendant must promptly disclose in writing
to the other party the name of each additional witness, and the
address and telephone number of each additional witness (other
than a victim) if:
(1) the disclosing party learns of the witness before or during
trial; and
(2) the witness should have been disclosed under Rule 12.1(a)
or (b) if the disclosing party had known of the witness earlier.

In addition, a similar change should be made to Rule 12.3 regarding
the addresses and telephone numbers of victims who will be used to
disprove a public-authority defense.
The Rationale:
This proposed change implements the victim’s right to be
“reasonably protected from the accused.”175 The victim cannot be
reasonably protected if the defendant, without good reason, is given
the victim’s address and telephone number. The proposed rule
strikes the current requirement that the prosecutor must
automatically give the defendant the victim’s address and telephone
number even without any showing of need. Nothing in the rule,
however, would bar the defendant from requesting that information
by filing an appropriate motion. The court could then determine
whether any such motion had merit.176

175. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
176. Cf. United States v. Wills, 88 F.3d 704, 709–10 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing delayed
disclosure of alibi witness because witness feared for safety and defendant had violent history
and allowing ex parte hearing because of need to keep identity of witness from the defendant).
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Rule 15—Victims’ Right To Attend Pre-Trial Depositions
The Proposal:
Rule 15 should allow victims to attend any public deposition in a
case as follows:
(i) Victims Can Attend. A Victim can attend any public
deposition taken under this rule under the same conditions as
govern a victim’s attendance at trial.

The Rationale:
Victims have the right “not to be excluded from any . . . public
court proceeding,” except in rare cases where their testimony will be
materially affected.177 Depositions authorized by Rule 15 are for the
purpose of preserving evidence for trial,178 and thus are effectively an
extension of the trial. Victims accordingly have the right to attend
such proceedings, if public, under the same conditions governing
their attendance at trial. To avoid any confusion over this issue, the
proposed rule change directly states that conclusion.
Because victims can be excluded from the trial in certain rare
situations where their testimony would be materially affected,179 they
can likewise be excluded from a deposition in those situations. The
proposed rule simply applies the limitations on attending trial to the
deposition setting by providing that the “same conditions” apply to
the victim’s attendance at the deposition.

177. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 437 (10th Cir. 1995).
179. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3), discussed infra notes 276–308 and accompanying text.
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Rule 17—Victims’ Right to Notice of Subpoena
of Confidential Information

The Proposal:
Rule 17 regarding subpoenas should be modified to give victims
notice before personal or confidential information is subpoenaed and
to allow victims to file a motion to quash such a subpoena as follows:
(h)(2) Victim Information. After indictment, no record or
document containing personal or confidential information about a
victim may be subpoenaed without a finding by the court that the
information is relevant to trial and that compliance appears to be
reasonable. If the court makes such a finding, notice shall then be
given to the victim, through the attorney for the government or for
the victim, before the subpoena is served. On motion made
promptly by the victim, the court may quash or modify the
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.

The Rationale:
The existing rules governing subpoenas are flawed because they
allow the parties to subpoena personal or confidential information
about a victim from third parties without the victim’s knowledge.
This issue arose recently in the Utah state criminal proceedings
involving the kidnapping of Elizabeth Smart. Elizabeth was
kidnapped from her home in Salt Lake City, Utah. She was found
nearly nine months later with a local transient and his wife, who had
taken Elizabeth at knifepoint.180 Attorneys for Elizabeth’s alleged
kidnapper subpoenaed class records from her high school—class and
teacher lists, report cards, and disciplinary and attendance records—
and medical records from her hospital.181 While the hospital refused
to turn over the requested records, the school willingly turned over
the requested records without notice to the Smart family. Elizabeth’s
father learned about the subpoena only after her school records had
already been turned over to defense counsel. The Smart family
180. See generally ED SMART & LOIS SMART WITH LAURA MORTON, BRINGING
ELIZABETH HOME: A JOURNEY OF FAITH AND HOPE (2003).
181. Stephen Hunt, Defense Blasted for Obtaining Smart’s School Records, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Jan. 14, 2005, at B2.
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attorney then filed a motion to return the records to the school.
Prosecutors in the case have objected to the fact that they were not
given an opportunity to file a motion to quash.182 The matter is still
under review in state court.
The problem that occurred in the Smart case under the Utah
rules could also occur under the federal rules.183 The federal rules
currently allow the witness to whom the subpoena is issued to
object,184 but there is no provision for notifying the victim when
personal or confidential information has been subpoenaed from
another witness.
Serving such subpoenas without notice to the victim violates the
provisions of the CVRA guaranteeing victims the rights to be treated
“with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy” and “with
fairness.”185 Allowing subpoenas to go directly to third-party
custodians of records can fail to protect privacy if the custodian is
disinterested or disinclined to protect the victim’s privacy. Such a
scenario is not far-fetched; a third party who is subpoenaed will often
have no interest in incurring legal fees to protect a victim’s rights.
Even if interested, third parties may not fully understand the
sensitive nature of certain victim information. Victims may also have
important statutory rights to protect. In the Elizabeth Smart case,
for example, the school may have violated the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act by turning over private information about
Elizabeth.186
Subpoenas served without notice to victims may also raise
constitutional concerns.187 It is well settled that a right to privacy is
implicitly incorporated within the protections guaranteed under the

182. Pat Reavy, Quash Smart Subpoenas, DA Says, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Feb. 1,
2005, at B3.
183. See Letter from Gregory G. Skordas, attorney for Elizabeth Smart, to Judge Susan
Bucklew (May 23, 2005) (on file with author) (proposing changes to the federal rules to avoid
recurrence of this problem in federal court).
184. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
185. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8).
186. Pat Reavy, Elizabeth Wants Records Returned, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Jan. 15,
2005, at B3; see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000) (establishing rights of privacy in educational
records).
187. See generally Wendy J. Murphy, Using the Federal Courts To Make State Courts
Respect Victims’ Rights, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (discussing federal
constitutional rights of privacy for victims’ confidential records).
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United States Constitution. The Supreme Court “has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.”188 Supreme
Court precedent establishes two lines of privacy interests: (1) the
“individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and
(2) “the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions.”189 In essence, the right to privacy includes an
individual’s interest in making certain decisions that fundamentally
affect his or her person “free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion.”190 In light of interests such as these, several courts have
held that crime victims’ records—such as rape crisis counseling
records—are not subject to subpoena.191
The proposed new rule protects victims’ statutory and potential
constitutional interests in two ways. First, the court is required to
make a preliminary determination that the subpoena seeks
information relevant at trial and that compliance appears to be
reasonable. This is consistent with the trial court’s existing power to
quash unreasonable subpoenas, including subpoenas directed at
crime victims.192 Second, if the court makes a preliminary
determination that the subpoena is appropriate, the victim would
then receive notice of the subpoena. To avoid harassment, the notice
would be provided either through the victim’s own attorney or,
more commonly, through the prosecutor.
The proposed rule makes no substantive change in the right of
the party to obtain appropriate information through a subpoena.
Instead, it merely changes procedures to ensure victims are treated
fairly by having the opportunity to file a motion to quash where such
188. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
189. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977).
190. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also Carey v. Population Servs.
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977).
191. See, e.g., State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Courts, 836 P.2d 445, 451–52 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992) (crime victim had the right to deny defendant access to medical records);
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290, 1296–97 (Pa. 1992). See generally Tera Jckowski
Peterson, Distrust and Discovery: The Impending Debacle in Discovery of Rape Victims’
Counseling Records in Utah, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 695; Anna Y. Joo, Note, Broadening the
Scope of Counselor-Patient Privilege To Protect the Privacy of the Sexual Assault Survivor, 32
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 255 (1995).
192. See, e.g., Amsler v. United States, 391 F.2d 37, 51 (9th Cir. 1967) (upholding trial
court’s decision to quash subpoena directed to kidnapping victim’s father for lack of
materiality).
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a motion is appropriate. The court is then authorized to grant the
victim’s motion to quash under the same standards that already apply
to other motions to quash—where compliance would be
“unreasonable or oppressive.”193
The proposed change does not interfere with the legitimate
interests of the government or defendants. The change will not
hamper government investigations because it applies only to
subpoenas issued after indictment. Before indictment, a victim’s
privacy is protected through grand jury secrecy. After indictment, the
only legitimate purpose for a subpoena by either the government or
the defendant is to obtain testimony or evidence for trial or similar
court hearing. Rule 17 does not permit a subpoena for discovery
purposes,194 although upon a proper showing a party can obtain pretrial access to materials.195 Therefore, when challenged by a victim on
a motion to quash, the party seeking the evidence will prevail upon a
proper showing that the subpoena is appropriate. The only change
made by the rule, then, is to require preliminary screening by the
court when confidential information is involved and give the victim
the opportunity for court review in cases where legitimate interests
are at stake. Constitutional interests in privacy and the victim’s right
to be treated “with fairness” require nothing less.
Rule 18—Victims’ Interests Considered in Setting Place of Prosecution
The Proposal:
Rule 18 should be amended to require the court to consider the
convenience of victims in setting the place of prosecution as follows:
Unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government
must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was
committed. The court must set the place of trial within the district
with due regard for the convenience of the defendant, any victim,
and the witnesses, and the prompt administration of justice.

193. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2).
194. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 689 (1974).
195. See id. at 699.
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The Rationale:
This change helps to implement a victim’s right under the CVRA
to be treated “with fairness.”196 The rule change is modest. Rule 18
already requires the court to consider the convenience of the
“witnesses” in a case. In many cases, of course, the victim will be a
witness. But for clarity in those cases, and to account for cases in
which the victim will not be a witness, the rule should be amended
to refer specifically to victims.
Rule 20—Victims’ Views Considered Regarding Consensual Transfer
The Proposal:
Rule 20 should be amended to allow the court to consider the
victims’ views in any decision to transfer a case as follows:
(a) Consent to Transfer. A prosecution may be transferred from
the district where the indictment or information is pending, or
from which a warrant on a complaint has been issued, to the
district where the defendant is arrested, held, or present if:
(1) the defendant states in writing a wish to plead guilty or
nolo contendere and to waive trial in the district where the
indictment, information, or complaint is pending, consents in
writing to the court’s disposing of the case in the transferee
district, and files the statement in the transferee district; and
(2) the United States attorneys in both districts approve the
transfer in writing after consultation with any victim. If any
victim objects to the transfer, the United States attorney in the
transferring district or the victim’s attorney shall advise the
court where the indictment or information is pending of the
victim’s concerns.

A similar change should be made to Rule 20(d) regarding
transfer of juvenile proceedings.

196. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
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The Rationale:
As with the previous proposal, this change implements the
victim’s right under the CVRA to be “treated with fairness.”197 The
procedure for transferring a case for a plea is not constitutionally
required, but rather is designed for the convenience of the defendant
and the government.198 In considering whether such administrative
reasons justify a transfer, the concerns of the victim appropriately
enter into the balance. For reasons similar to those discussed above
in connection with changes regarding plea procedures, the
prosecution would be directed to confer with the victim and to
advise the court of any objection to the transfer.199
Rule 21—Victims’ Views Considered Regarding Transfer for Prejudice
The Proposal:
Rule 21 should be amended as follows to require consideration
of the victim’s interest in whether a case should be transferred:
(e) Victims’ Views. The court shall not transfer any proceeding
without giving any victim an opportunity to be heard. The court
shall consider the views of the victim in making any transfer
decision.

The Rationale:
Rule 21 authorizes the trial judge to transfer a case to avoid
prejudice or for the convenience of the parties. The proposed rule
would require that the court consider the victim’s concerns in
making any such transfer decision. Such consideration would seem to
be part and parcel of protecting the victim’s right to be “treated with
fairness.” In addition, the vicinage provision of Article III and the
public’s First Amendment right of access to trials give constitutional
dimensions to the victim’s interest in transfer decisions.

197. Id. § 3771(a)(8).
198. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 321, at 357–58.
199. See supra notes 158–174 and accompanying text.
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Victims may have compelling interests in observing the trial in
their local community.200 Traveling to a remote location to watch the
trial may be financially difficult for many victims and impossible for
indigent victims. Moreover, forcing victims to travel to distant
communities alone may deprive them of the accompaniment and
support of family and friends, which may be especially important
when observing emotionally charged court proceedings.
Defendants, too, have the right to have cases tried locally. Under
the Sixth Amendment, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . . .”201 This right might be viewed as the defendant’s to
assert or waive as circumstances dictate. For federal cases, however,
the vicinage right is not exclusively placed in the hands of the
defendant. Instead, Article III provides that “[t]he Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes have been
committed.”202
This difference in language supports the reading that the federal
provision is a structural guarantee designed to protect broader
interests than the defendant’s alone.203 Moreover, the provision
provides for trial in the state where the crime was committed. In
most cases, this state would be where the victim resided; whether the
defendant also resided in that state would be incidental.
An understanding of the Article III provision as protecting the
community’s interest is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s decisions
on right of public access to trials. In cases such as Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,204 the Court has held that a guarantee
of the public’s right to attend trials is implicit in the First
Amendment. Compelling victims’ interests underlie this guarantee.
As the Court has explained, “the presence of interested spectators

200. See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, 392–99 (reviewing case
law on the victim’s interest in venue decisions).
201. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
202. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
203. See Steven A. Engel, The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1687 (2000); see also Drew L. Kirshen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 803
(1976).
204. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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may keep [the defendant’s] triers keenly alive to a sense of their
responsibility and to the importance of their functions.”205 In
addition, “public proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims
and the community in knowing that offenders are being brought to
account for their criminal conduct.”206 As Justice Blackmun has
emphasized, “The victim of the crime, the family of the victim, [and]
others who have suffered similarly . . . have an interest in observing
the course of a prosecution.”207 Victims are vitally interested in
observing criminal trials because society has withdrawn “both from
the victim and the vigilante the enforcement of criminal laws, but [it]
cannot erase from people’s consciousness the fundamental, natural
yearning to see justice done—or even the urge for retribution.”208 To
be sure, transferring a trial to a distant city may not flatly violate the
public right of access to a trial, but it can surely burden the rights of
the public, including the victim, which suggests that victims ought
to be heard before any such decision is made.
The Article III vicinage provision and the public right of access
to trials provide constitutional underpinnings for construing the
victim’s rights under the CVRA to include a right to be heard on
transfer proceedings. In addition, Congress has mandated that
victims be treated with fairness. This is a broad provision intended to
be broadly construed and to give victims a right to due process. As
Senator Kyl has stated,
The broad rights articulated in this section are meant to be rights
themselves and are not intended to just be aspirational. One of
these rights is the right to be treated with fairness. Of course,
fairness includes the notion of due process. Too often victims of crime
experience a secondary victimization at the hands of the criminal
justice system. This provision is intended to direct Government
agencies and employees, whether they are in executive or judicial
branches, to treat victims of crime with the respect they deserve
and to afford them due process.209

205. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979) (internal citation omitted).
206. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984).
207. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 428 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
208. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571.
209. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910–11 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(emphases added).
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Clearly, Congress intended to afford crime victims a broad right
to due process in criminal proceedings. Due process, of course,
uncontroversially includes a right to be heard.210 Thus, victims
should be heard before the court makes a transfer decision.
Concluding that victims have a right to be heard on transfer
decision does not mean, of course, that they will dictate the transfer
decision. In some cases, the defendant will be able to establish
sufficiently pervasive prejudice in a particular community to entitle
him to a change of venue to protect his constitutional rights.211 But
the limited point here is that victims may provide an important
perspective that the judge ought to consider in reaching a decision.
Moreover, even if the judge decides to transfer a case, the victims
may have valuable information for the judge on where to transfer the
case to (e.g., to an adjacent state rather than a distant one).
An illustration of the general approach of the proposed rule
comes from State v. Timmendequas,212 a capital case decided by the
New Jersey Supreme Court. In Timmendequas, the trial judge
imported a jury from a distant community rather than force the
family of a murdered young girl to travel to another district.
Construing New Jersey state law provisions similar to the CVRA’s,
the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the trial judge
properly considered the views of the victim’s family:
Over the past decade, both nationwide and in New Jersey, a
significant amount of legislation has been passed implementing
increased levels of protection for victims of crime. Specifically, in
New Jersey, the Legislature enacted the “Crime Victim’s Bill of
Rights.” That amendment marked the culmination of the
Legislature’s efforts to increase the participation of crime victims in
the criminal justice system.

210. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(acknowledging that “[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to
be heard” (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914))).
211. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (holding that prisoner should have
been granted change of venue where pre-trial publicity caused prejudice). But cf. FLETCHER,
supra note 155, at 252 (calling for abolition of a defendant’s right to change venue because it
“is, in effect, to accord the defense a whole peremptory challenge against the entire
community”).
212. 737 A.2d 55 (N.J. 1999).
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The purpose of the Victim’s Rights Amendment was to
“enhance and protect the necessary role of crime victims and
witnesses in the criminal justice process. In furtherance of [that
goal], the improved treatment of these persons should be assured
through the establishment of specific rights.” One of the
enumerated rights guaranteed for victims is “[t]o have
inconveniences associated with participation in the criminal justice
process minimized to the fullest extent possible.”

....
. . . The [trial] court explicitly stated that it was not favoring the
rights of the victims over those of defendant. Rather, it was simply
taking their concerns into consideration, as it had not done
previously. Taking the concerns of the victim’s family into account
does not constitute error, provided that the constitutional rights of
the defendant are not denied or infringed on by that decision.213

Just as the New Jersey courts have recognized that victims’
interests should be considered in transfer decisions, the federal courts
should do the same. Therefore, Rule 21 should be amended to allow
victims to provide information to the judge on transfer decisions.
Rule 23—Victims’ Views Considered Regarding Non-Jury Trial
The Proposal:
The court should be required to consider the views of victims
before allowing waiver of a jury trial as follows:
Rule 23. Jury or Nonjury Trial
(a) Jury Trial. If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial
must be by jury unless:
(1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing;
(2) the government consents; and
(3) the court approves after considering the views of any
victims.
213. Id. at 76 (internal citations omitted). The hardship to the victim was established via
affidavits from the victim’s family provided to the court by the prosecutor.
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The Rationale:
In the federal courts the “preferred” trial method is a jury trial.214
As Justice Blackmun has explained, the public has interests,
independent of a criminal defendant, in monitoring judges, police,
and prosecutors—and in being educated about “the manner in
which criminal justice is administered.”215 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has concluded that defendants can waive their right to a jury
trial.216 To help protect the general public interest in trial by jury,
Rule 23 requires not only prosecutor approval217 but also judicial
approval before proceeding by way of bench trial. This approval
requires careful weighing of the competing concerns. The Supreme
Court has instructed that
the duty of the trial court [in considering whether to approve a jury
trial waiver] is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but
with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid
unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from
any of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing
in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity.218

This is a “serious and weighty responsibility.”219

214. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) (“Trial by jury has been
established by the Constitution as the ‘normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of
fact in criminal cases.’” (citation omitted)). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the
Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 33, 68 (2003).
215. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 428 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in
part).
216. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). But cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1196–98 (1991) (mounting a strong
argument against Patton and noting that before 1930 court decisions had held jury trial could
not be waived).
217. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a)(2). But cf. Adam H. Kurland, Providing a Criminal
Defendant with a Unilateral Right to a Bench Trial: A Renewed Call To Amend Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 23(a), 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1993) (suggesting that prosecutorial
consent should be eliminated by the legislature). See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 15-1.2, cmt. at 15.17 (2d ed. 1980) (concluding that arguments in favor of
requiring prosecutorial approval of jury trial waivers outweigh those against).
218. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312–13.
219. United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation
omitted).
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To discharge that serious and weighty responsibility, the trial
court should receive as much information as possible. The victim is
often well situated to provide information about how the public will
view a non-jury trial. The proposed rule change takes the modest
step of requiring the court to hear the victim before approving any
non-jury trial, a step that is consistent with the CVRA’s command
that victims be treated with fairness.
Importantly, this change would not interfere with defendants’
rights. The Supreme Court has squarely held that the defendant lacks
any constitutional right to unilaterally elect a bench trial.220 Of
course, in some circumstances, despite a victim’s objection, a nonjury trial nonetheless will be appropriate. Moreover, in extreme cases,
the defendant may have a right to a non-jury trial where pretrial
publicity has pervasively tainted the jury pool.221 Nothing in the
proposed rule change would interfere with a court’s right to approve
a bench trial in such circumstances, so long as the court considers
the victim’s perspective as part of the approval process.
Rule 32(a)—Deleting Old Definition of “Victim”
The Proposal:
The definition of “victim” currently contained in Rule 32 should
be stricken as follows:
Rule 32. Sentencing and Judgment
(a) Definitions. The following definitions apply under this rule:
(1) “Crime of violence or sexual abuse” means:
(A) a crime that involves the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against another’s person or
property; or
(B) a crime under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2248 or §§ 2251–
2257.
220. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) (finding that waiver of jury trial
may be conditioned on consent of prosecutor); cf. Kurland, supra note 217, at 340–46 (urging
that the rules be amended to create such a right, but not considering in any way the victim’s
interests involved).
221. See Singer, 380 U.S. at 37–38 (leaving this question open).
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(2) “Victim” means an individual against whom the defendant
committed an offense for which the court will impose sentence.

The Rationale:
The old definition of victim in Rule 32 is now too narrow, as it is
limited to crimes of violence or sexual abuse. The CVRA, in contrast,
includes all victims within its protections. In the proposed new rules,
“victim” would be defined in Rule 1.222 Accordingly, the narrower
definition found here can simply be eliminated. The Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules is well aware of this issue, having
withdrawn a previous proposal to expand Rule 32 to include all
victims in the wake of the CVRA.223
Rule 32(c)(1)(B)—Presentence Report Considering
Restitution in All Cases
The Proposal:
Rule 32(c)(1)(B) should be amended to require that the
presentence report contain restitution information in all cases as
follows:
(c) Presentence Investigation.
(1) Required Investigation.
(A) In General. The probation officer must conduct a
presentence investigation and submit a report to the court
before it imposes sentence unless:
(i) 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) or another statute requires
otherwise; or
(ii) the court finds that the information in the record
enables it to meaningfully exercise its sentencing
authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and the court
explains its finding on the record.
222. See supra notes 120–27 and accompanying text.
223. See Letter from Ed Carnes, Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (May 18, 2004) (on file with the author) (noting that proposed
expansion of Rule 32 should be withdrawn if the CVRA was passed).
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(B) Restitution. If the law requires permits restitution, the
probation officer must conduct an investigation and
submit a report that contains sufficient information for the
court to order restitution.

The Rationale:
As currently written, the rule directs that a presentence report
contain information about restitution only when the law “requires”
restitution. The proposed amendment directs that all presentence
reports contain appropriate restitution information whenever the law
“permits” restitution. If the law permits restitution, the court ought
to receive information sufficient to allow it to determine whether to
order such restitution. Only with such knowledge can the court
appropriately exercise its discretion.
In most cases, restitution is covered by one of two federal
statutes: the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA),224
and its predecessor, the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982
(VWPA).225 For all crimes of violence and certain crimes against
property, the MVRA firmly directs that “[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of
[certain offenses such as crimes of violence] . . . the court shall order
. . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense
or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim’s estate.”226 For other
crimes, the earlier VWPA controls. It permits the court to order
restitution in its discretion after considering various relevant
factors.227
In its current form, Rule 32(c)(1)(B) suggests that the probation
officer is required to include restitution information only in a case
covered by the MVRA because only then is restitution (in the
language of the current rule) “required.”228 No sound reason exists
224. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A, 3664 (2000).
225. Id. §§ 3663, 3664. See generally United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285
(D. Utah 2004) (discussing different statutes), rev’d on other grounds, United States v.
Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005).
226. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (emphasis added); see United States v. Monts, 311 F.3d
993, 1001 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that restitution under the MVRA is mandatory).
227. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3); see United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 801 (7th
Cir. 1985) (holding that restitution under the VWPA is discretionary).
228. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(B).
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for such a limitation, particularly after the enactment of the CVRA.
The CVRA guarantees that victims have “the right to full and timely
restitution as provided in law.”229 Even when the court is proceeding
under the discretionary VWPA, without appropriate information in
the presentence report, the court cannot determine whether to
exercise its discretion to award restitution. Therefore, the rule should
be changed to require that the presentence report contain restitution
information, from which the court can determine whether to make a
restitution award.
(New) Rule 32(c)(3)—Probation Officer To Seek
Out Victim Information
The Proposal:
The probation officer preparing a presentence report should be
directed to determine whether a victim wishes to provide
information for the report as follows:
(3) Victim Information. The probation officer must determine
whether any victim wishes to provide information for the
presentence report.

The Rationale:
Under the CVRA, the victim has “[t]he right to be reasonably
heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving . . .
sentencing . . . .”230 This right clearly encompasses the victim’s right
to allocate, or make an oral statement at sentencing, as discussed
below in connection with Rule 32(i).231 However, the right to be
“reasonably heard” also appears to include the opportunity to
provide information to the probation office during preparation of the
presentence report.
As Senator Kyl explained, the victim’s right to be heard at
sentencing should be broadly construed:

229. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(6) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
230. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4).
231. See infra notes 273–75 and accompanying text.
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[The CVRA] provides victims the right to reasonably be heard at
any public proceeding involving . . . sentencing. This provision is
intended to allow crime victims to directly address the court in
person. It is not necessary for the victim to obtain the permission of
either party to do so . . . . When a victim invokes this right during
. . . sentencing proceedings, it is intended that . . . he or she be
allowed to provide all three types of victim impact: the character of
the victim, the impact of the crime on the victim, the victims’
family and the community, and sentencing recommendations . . . .
It is not the intent of the term “reasonably” in the phrase “to be
reasonably heard” to provide any excuse for denying a victim the
right to appear in person and directly address the court. Indeed,
the very purpose of this section is to allow the victim to appear
personally and directly address the court. This section would fail in
its intent if courts determined that written, rather than oral
communication, could generally satisfy this right. On the other
hand, the term “reasonably” is meant to allow for alternative
methods of communicating a victim’s views to the court when the
victim is unable to attend the proceedings. Such circumstances
might arise, for example, if the victim is incarcerated on unrelated
matters at the time of the proceedings or if a victim cannot afford
to travel to a courthouse. In such cases, communication by the
victim to the court is permitted by other reasonable means.232

In light of this legislative history, victims undoubtedly have a
right to make an in-court statement at sentencing as part of their
right “to be heard.” But they also have the right to communicate in
other ways with the court. At sentencing, an obvious alternative way
is via the probation officer. If there is any doubt about whether the
right “to be heard” covers communications to the probation officer,
the right “to be treated with fairness” comfortably covers such a
requirement.
The proposed rule requires that the probation office affirmatively
seek out the victim. It is unlikely that a probation officer could
properly prepare a thorough presentence report without obtaining
the victim’s views. Indeed, the rules already require the officer to
include victim information in the report.233 Because there is no way
232. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(emphases added); see also id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
233. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 32(d)(2)(B)).
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to know in advance whether the victim will have relevant information
for the report, the probation officer should be required to investigate
that possibility. Of course, nothing in the proposed rule change
would require the probation officer to include irrelevant or
argumentative information in the report.
Rule 32(d)(2)(B)—Presentence Report To Contain
Victim Information
The Proposal:
Rule 32(d)(2)(B) should be amended to refer directly to victims
in describing the content of the presentence report and to conform
to the style used for information about defendants as follows:
(2) Additional Information. The presentence report must also
contain the following information:
(A) the defendant’s history and characteristics, including:
(i) any prior criminal record;
(ii) the defendant’s financial condition; and
(iii) any circumstances affecting the defendant’s behavior
that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in correctional
treatment;
(B) verified information, stated in a nonargumentative style,
that assesses the financial, social, psychological, and medical
impact on any individual against whom the offense has been
committed any victim of the crime . . .

The Rationale:
As discussed at the outset of this article,234 Rule 32(d)(2)(B)
typifies the victim’s absence from the current federal rules by failing
to use the word “victim” in describing what information belongs in a
presentence report. In addition, the rule should be amended to
conform to the style used in describing the presentence report’s
information about the defendant. The rule dealing with the

234. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
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defendant’s background235 contains no requirement that information
be “verified” or stated in a “non-argumentative style.” As a matter of
even-handedness, no such requirement should be listed for victim
information. Of course, well-trained federal probation officers will no
doubt attempt to verify all information in the presentence report and
phrase all of the report in a non-argumentative style. The peculiarity
in the current rule is that, among the numerous subjects covered by
the rules, the verification and non-argumentative style requirements
apply to victim information alone.
Rule 32(e)—Prosecutor To Disclose Presentence Report to Victim
The Proposal:
The prosecutor should be required to disclose relevant parts of
the presentence report to victims as follows:
(e) Disclosing the Report and Recommendation.
(1) Time to Disclose. Unless the defendant has consented in
writing, the probation officer must not submit a presentence
report to the court or disclose its contents to anyone until the
defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, or has been
found guilty.
(2) Minimum Required Notice. The probation officer must
give the presentence report to the defendant, the defendant’s
attorney, and an attorney for the government at least 35 days
before sentencing unless the defendant waives this minimum
period. The attorney for the government shall, if any victim
requests, communicate the relevant contents of the presentence
report to the victim.

The Rationale:
The presentence report plays a critical role in the federal
sentencing process. The report contains information about the
crime, the background of the defendant, the impact of the crime on
the victim, and other matters relevant to sentencing. Most
important, the report also contains a calculation under the Federal
235. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A).
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Sentencing Guidelines specifying a range for any recommended
prison sentence (e.g., forty-six to fifty-seven months). While judges
need not slavishly impose a sentence within this range,236 most trial
judges give significant weight to the Guidelines calculation,237 and
appellate courts have discouraged straying too far from the
Guidelines without good reason.238
The CVRA entitles victims to be heard on disputed Guidelines
issues and, as a corollary, entitles them to the right to review parts of
the presentence report relevant to those issues. The CVRA gives
victims “[t]he right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding
in the district court involving . . . sentencing . . . .”239 This codifies
the right of crime victims to provide what is known as a “victim
impact statement” to the court.240 The victim’s right to be heard,
however, is not narrowly circumscribed to just impact information.
To the contrary, the right conferred is a broad one—to be
“reasonably heard” at the sentencing proceeding.
The victim’s right to be “reasonably heard” is best understood as
giving the victim the opportunity to speak about disputed issues
regarding the Sentencing Guidelines calculation. As Senator Kyl
explained, the right to be heard includes the right to make
sentencing recommendations:
When a victim invokes this right [to be heard] during . . .
sentencing proceedings, it is intended that the [sic] he or she be
allowed to provide all three types of victim impact [information]:
the character of the victim, the impact of the crime on the victim,

236. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005) (giving
“heavy weight” to Guidelines recommendation).
238. See, e.g., United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Rogers, 400 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 2005).
239. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
240. See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, at 625–67 (discussing
victim impact statements); Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the
Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1395–96; cf. Dan
Narled, State, Be Not Proud: A Retroactive Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2005).
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recommendations.241
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community,
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sentencing

A “sentencing recommendation” will often directly implicate
Guidelines issues. For example, if the victim wishes to recommend a
hundred-month sentence when the maximum guideline range is only
fifty-seven months, that sentencing recommendation is essentially
meaningless unless a victim can provide a basis for recalculating the
Guidelines or departing or varying from them.242
Because a victim has the right to be heard on a Guidelines issue,
a victim also has the right to see the document which contains the
Guidelines calculations—the presentence report.243 Congress
intended the victim’s right to be heard to be construed broadly, as
Senator Feinstein stated: “The victim of crime, or their counsel,
should be able to provide any information, as well as their opinion,
directly to the court concerning the . . . sentencing of the
accused.”244 It is hard to see how victims can meaningfully provide
“any information” that would have a bearing on the sentence
without being informed of the Guidelines calculations that likely will
drive the sentence and reviewing the document that underlies those
calculations.
An independent basis for victims reviewing presentence reports is
within the victim’s broad right under the CVRA to be “treated with
fairness.”245 This right easily encompasses a right of access to relevant
parts of the presentence report. The victim’s right to fairness gives
victims a free-standing right to due process. As Senator Kyl
instructed, “Of course, fairness includes the notion of due process . . . .

241. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added). See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, at ch. 10 (discussing three
types of victim impact information).
242. See United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1272–73 (D. Utah 2005)
(discussing departures and variances from the Guidelines).
243. Magistrate Judge Orenstein of the Eastern District of New York, who has written
many thoughtful opinions on the CVRA, has taken a contrary position. See Report and
Recommendation, United States v. Ingrassis, No. CR 04-0455 at 31 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005)
(“[I]n the absence of any change to applicable rules or the Guidelines, the court is under no
legal obligation to ensure such disclosure” of the presentence report.). For the reasons
explained here, I think he takes too narrow a view of the victim’s rights at sentencing.
244. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)
(emphasis added).
245. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).

894

A_CASSELL.FIN

835]

10/24/2005 6:31 PM

Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules

This provision is intended to direct government agencies and
employees, whether they are in the executive or judicial branches, to
treat victims of crime with the respect they deserve and to afford
them due process.”246 Due process principles dictate that victims have
the right to be apprised of Guidelines calculations and related issues.
The Supreme Court has explained that “[i]t is . . . fundamental that
the right to . . . an opportunity to be heard ‘must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”247 It is not
“meaningful” for victims to make sentencing recommendations
without the benefit of knowing what everyone else in that
courtroom knows: the recommended Guidelines range and how that
range was derived. Congress plainly intended to pass a law
establishing “[f]air play for crime victims, meaningful participation
of crime victims in the justice system, [and] protection against a
government that would take from a crime victim the dignity of due
process.”248 In federal sentencing today, meaningful participation
means participation regarding Guidelines issues.
It is interesting that the federal law allowing appointment of a
guardian ad litem for juvenile victims appears to allow for access to
the presentence report. The law guarantees that, upon appointment,
a guardian ad litem “may have access to all reports, evaluations and
records, except attorney’s work product, necessary to effectively
advocate for the child.”249 In a recent federal “shaken baby” case in
Arizona, a guardian for the child victim received access to the
presentence report under this provision.250 The guardian in that case
found it exceedingly difficult to formulate an appropriate sentencing
recommendation without access to the presentence report. After
successfully gaining access to the report, she found a need to change
her original recommendation. She later reported that “[b]ut for the

246. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(emphases added).
247. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).
248. 150 CONG. REC. S4264 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis
added).
249. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(h)(2) (2000).
250. See United States v. James, No. CR-04-0651-PCT-JAT (D. Ariz. 2005).
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disclosure, I would have ended up making a mis-informed
recommendation.”251
A victim’s right to review the presentence report is also
important to ensure proper restitution. Federal law guarantees most
victims of serious crimes the right to restitution.252 Reinforcing those
laws, the CVRA guarantees that victims have “[t]he right to full and
timely restitution as provided in law.”253 As a practical matter, many
of the calculations supporting a restitution award will rest on
information in the presentence report. While the restitution statutes
have their own detailed procedural provisions,254 the presentence
report is clearly a central part of the restitution process. If a
presentence report fails to accurately recount restitution figures,
crime victims may be short-changed. For all these reasons, the
CVRA should be understood as giving victims the right to review
relevant parts of the presentence report and to be heard before a
court makes any final conclusions about Guidelines calculations and
other sentencing issues. Many states follow a similar approach and
give victims access to the presentence report.255
In February 2005, I testified before the Sentencing Commission
to recommend a change in the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Guidelines Manual along the lines of the proposals contained in this

251. E-mail from Keli Luther, Arizona Voice for Victims, to Paul G. Cassell (June 20,
2005) (on file with author).
252. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (Mandatory Victims Restitution Act); see also id. § 3663
(Victim Witness Protection Act).
253. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(6) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
254. 18 U.S.C. § 3664.
255. ALA. CODE § 15-23-73 (1975) (“victim shall have the right to review a copy of the
pre-sentence investigative report, subject to the applicable federal or state confidentiality
laws”); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.023 (2004) (giving victim right to look at portions of
sentencing report); ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1 (giving victim right to review presentence
report when available to the defendant); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4425 (2004) (giving
victim right to review presentence report “except those parts excised by the court or made
confidential by law”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001 (2000) (giving victim right to review
presentence report); IDAHO CODE § 19-5306 (2004) (giving victim right to review
presentence report); IND. STAT. ANN. 35-40-5-6(b) (2004) (giving victim right to read and
“respond to” material contained in the presentence report); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (giving
victim “right to review and comment upon the presentence report”); MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-18-113 (2005) (giving prosecutor discretion to disclose contents of presentence report to
victim); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.077 (2003) (presentence report may be made available to
victim); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-304(5) (2005) (giving prosecutor discretion to
allow victim or victim’s family to see presentence report).

896

A_CASSELL.FIN

835]

10/24/2005 6:31 PM

Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules

Article.256 In particular, I suggested that the Commission change its
current rule, which allows only the parties to see the presentence
report.257 The Practitioners’ Advisory Group to the Sentencing
Commission later disputed my proposal. In a letter to the
Commission,258 they argued that “[n]othing in the CVRA or its
legislative history states that crime victims should be permitted to
review portions of the presentence report, dispute guidelines
calculations, raise grounds for departure, or, as such rights would
seem to imply, appeal a sentence on factual or legal grounds.”259 The
Practitioners’ Group also cited the drafting history of the proposed
constitutional amendment protecting victims’ rights, which they
thought was limited to giving a victim merely the right to “allocute”
at sentencing—that is, merely to provide victim impact
information.260
The Practitioners’ Group’s arguments are flawed for several
reasons. First, the Group too narrowly views the relevant legislative
history of the CVRA. As explained above, Congress intended for
victims to have broad rights in the sentencing process, including
rights to be reasonably heard in a meaningful manner.261 It is not
reasonable to deprive victims of the critical information in the
presentence report. Second, the Practioners’ Group inaccurately
describes the relevant history of the Victims’ Rights Amendment. It
is true that the proposed constitutional amendment contained a right
to be “reasonably heard,” just as the CVRA does. However, the
Practitioner’s Group fails to recognize that the legislative history of
the amendment suggests that Congress was taking an expansive view
of the victim’s right to be heard at sentencing, including a view that

256. See The Effect of United States v. Booker on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Feb. 15, 2005) (statement of Paul G. Cassell,
United States Judge for the District of Utah), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/
02_15_05/cassell_testimony.pdf.
257. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1 Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 6A1.2 (West
2004).
258. Letter from Amy Baron-Evans & Mark Flanagan to Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa
(Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/
files/pag_letter.doc.
259. Id. at 2.
260. Id.
261. See supra notes 239–44 and accompanying text.
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would embrace a victim’s right to make a specific sentencing
recommendation.262
Most important, the Practitioners’ Group’s letter fails to consider
the impact of denying the victim access to the presentence report on
the victim’s right to fairness. Presumably the Group, comprised
primarily of defense attorneys, would be outraged if defendants were
sentenced without receiving notice about relevant parts of the
presentence report, because of the defendant’s due process rights.
But victims now also have due process rights during sentencing,
which make it clear that they should receive the same information.
The Practitioners’ Group raises one concern that can be readily
dispelled. The Group wonders whether a victim’s right to be heard
on Guidelines issues implies a general right to appeal a sentence. It
would not. The CVRA contains its own specific remedial provision,
which permits victims to appeal only denials of their rights.263 It
specifically allows a victim to file a motion “to re-open . . . a
sentence” only for violations of the victim’s “right to be heard.”264
Moreover, while victims possess due process protections, due process
does not guarantee a right to an appeal.265 Finally, the Sentencing
Reform Act spells out the limited rights of appeal on Guidelines
issues available to only the government and the defense.266 For all
these reasons, victims have the right to review relevant parts of the
262. The Group cites a 2000 Senate Judiciary Committee Report regarding the Victims’
Rights Amendment, which referenced a Tenth Circuit decision restricting the right of victims
to present a sentencing recommendation. See Letter from Amy Baron-Evans, supra note 258
(citing S. REP. NO. 106-254, at 12 (2000) (discussing Robinson v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216
(10th Cir. 1991))). By 2003, however, the same passage in the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report was changed to remove the citation to that case and instead to cite a leading proponent
of expansive rights for victims to give judges specific sentencing recommendations:
Victim impact statements concerning the character of the victim and the
impact of the crime remain constitutional. See Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional
Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282 (2003).
The Committee does not intend to alter or comment on laws existing in some States
allowing for victim opinion as to the proper sentence.
S. REP. NO. 108-191, at 38 (2003). It is hard to see anything in this history suggesting that
Congress wanted victims to be deprived of the chance to review presentence reports.
263. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). See generally In re W.R.
Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 561–64 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing appeals under
CVRA).
264. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5).
265. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
266. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000).
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presentence report and to be heard on Guidelines issues in the trial
court, but if the court properly hears them on the Guidelines issues,
victims would not have the right to appeal the sentence the court
ultimately imposes.
Because victims have a right of access to the presentence report,
the question arises of how to provide that access. Nothing in current
law precludes releasing presentence reports to victims. While 18
U.S.C. § 3552 requires disclosure to government and defense
counsel, it does not forbid further dissemination. Several federal
courts have held that circulation of reports to third parties is proper
on a showing of particularized need approved by the court.267 Some
courts’ local rules also allow additional distribution with court
approval.268 Victims always have a particularized need for access to
the Guidelines calculations and related parts of the presentence
report; without such access they are unable to effectively make their
sentencing recommendation.
In view of that legal landscape, there are three ways in which the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure might deal with disclosure of
the presentence reports to victims:
(1) Complete Disclosure. The rules could direct full disclosure of
the presentence report to the victim. While no statute bars this
approach, legitimate policy objections might be raised. Some reports
may contain sensitive private information about the defendant such
as results of psychiatric examinations, prior history of drug use, or
childhood sexual abuse. Some reports may also reveal confidential
law enforcement information that should not be widely circulated.
Victims may not always need access to these parts of the report.
While a number of states give victims unfettered right to access the
presentence report,269 a more limited approach seems appropriate in
the federal system.

267. See, e.g., United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 238 (7th Cir. 1989) (compelling,
particularized need standard); United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1579 (9th Cir. 1988)
(interests of justice standard); United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1174 (2d
Cir. 1983) (compelling need standard).
268. See, e.g., D. UTAH CRIM. LOCAL R. 32-1(c) (presentence reports not released
without order of the court).
269. See supra note 255.
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(2) Selective Disclosure. The rules could direct that the probation
office redact any presentence report to remove confidential
information and then provide the redacted report to the victim. This
approach, too, is problematic; it would require considerable work by
busy probation officers to prepare an additional document—a
redacted report—presumably only after consulting with the attorneys
on both sides of the case about what might be viewed as
confidential.
(3) Disclosure through Prosecutors. The simplest solution to the
competing concerns is to disclose the report to victims through an
intermediary: the prosecutor. The prosecutor would serve as the
filter for confidential information and assist the victim by
highlighting critical parts of the report. Opponents might object that
this approach would burden prosecutors, who are no less busy than
probation officers. But the CVRA already gives victims the right to
“confer” with prosecutors,270 and presumably they will confer
regarding the important topic of sentencing. Moreover, many U.S.
Attorney’s Offices already have Victim-Witness Coordinators who
communicate with victims regarding impact statements. The CVRA
also authorizes increased funding of $22 million for the VictimWitness Assistance Programs in U.S. Attorney’s Offices, presumably
enabling those offices to expand their victim services.271
It might be burdensome to require that prosecutors disclose
presentence reports to victims in all cases, even when they are not
interested in such disclosure. Accordingly, disclosure of the report
should be required only upon request of a victim.
For all those reasons, the Commission should amend the rules to
give requesting victims access to presentence reports through the
prosecutor. In addition, some of the aspects of preparing and
disclosing presentence reports are covered in Chapter 6.A of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual.272 The Manual falls
within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
Accordingly, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules should

270. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
271. See 118 Stat. 2260, 2264 (2004).
272. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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coordinate with the Commission to ensure that any changes in the
Criminal Rules are consistent with the provisions of the Manual.
Rule 32(f), (h), (i)—Victim Opportunity To Object
to Presentence Report
The Proposal:
Rule 32(f), (h), and (i) should be amended to allow the victim to
object to the presentence report as follows:
(f) Objecting to the Report.
(1) Time To Object. Within 14 days after receiving the
presentence report, the parties must state in writing any
objections, including objections to material information,
sentencing guideline ranges, and policy statements contained in
or omitted from the report. The attorney for the government
or for the victim shall raise for the victim any reasonable
objection by the victim to the presentence report.
(2) Serving Objections. An objecting party must provide a
copy of its objections to the opposing party and to the
probation officer.
(3) Action on Objections. After receiving objections, the
probation officer may meet with the parties and the victim to
discuss the objections. The probation officer may then
investigate further and revise the presentence report as
appropriate.
....
(h) Notice of Possible Departure from Sentencing Guidelines.
Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range
on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence
report or in a party’s prehearing submission or in a victim impact
statement, the court must give the parties reasonable notice that it
is contemplating such a departure. The notice must specify any
ground on which the court is contemplating a departure. The
attorney for the government or for the victim shall advise defense
counsel and the court of any ground identified by the victim that
might reasonably serve as a basis for departure.
(i) Sentencing.
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(1) In General. At sentencing, the court:
(A) must verify that the defendant and the defendant’s
attorney have read and discussed the presentence report
and any addendum to the report;
(B) must give to the defendant and an attorney for the
government a written summary of—or summarize in
camera—any information excluded from the presentence
report under Rule 32(d)(3) on which the court will rely in
sentencing, and give them a reasonable opportunity to
comment on that information;
(C) must allow the parties’ attorneys and any victims to
comment on the probation officer’s determinations and
other matters relating to an appropriate sentence; and
(D) may, for good cause, allow a party or any victim to
make a new objection at any time before sentence is
imposed.
(2) Introducing Evidence; Producing a Statement. The court
may permit the parties or the victim to introduce evidence on
the objections. If a witness testifies at sentencing, Rule
26.2(a)–(d) and (f) applies. If a party fails to comply with a
Rule 26.2 order to produce a witness’s statement, the court
must not consider that witness’s testimony.
(3) Court Determinations. At sentencing, the court:
(A) may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence
report as a finding of fact;
(B) must—for any disputed portion of the presentence
report or other controverted matter—rule on the dispute
or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the
matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will
not consider the matter in sentencing; and
(C) must append a copy of the court’s determinations
under this rule to any copy of the presentence report made
available to the Bureau of Prisons.

The Rationale:
For the reasons explained in the preceding section, the victim’s
right to be “reasonably heard” at a sentencing hearing encompasses
the right to be heard on Sentencing Guidelines issues. Congress
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intended that the victim become a participant in the process with
rights “independent of the Government or the defendant.”273 Those
independent rights include the opportunity to make “sentencing
recommendations.”274 Given that matters in the presentence report
may often determine what effect a sentencing recommendation will
have, the victim’s right presumably extends to participating in the
process that determines the Guideline range.
The changes in Rule 32 noted above simply incorporate the
victim in the Guidelines process. Changing the rule in this fashion
would also clarify the appropriate sequencing of sentencing hearings.
Rule 32(i) already allows the victim to submit “any information”
about the sentencing.275 Yet if the experience in my court is any
guide, the victim’s allocution frequently occurs only after the court
has decided all the issues surrounding the presentence report. For
the victim’s right to provide information to the court to truly have
meaning, the victim’s information must be presented early enough
to potentially affect critical sentencing issues, including issues about
Guidelines calculations.
As with the changes discussed in the previous section, changes in
the Sentencing Guidelines Manual are also required here. The
Advisory Committee also should coordinate with the Sentencing
Commission to ensure that its actions are consistent.
Rule 32(i)(4)—Conforming Amendment to Victims’
Right To Be Heard
The Proposal:
Rule 32(i)(4) should be amended to conform the definition of
victim to that found in the CVRA as follows:
(B) By a Victim. Before imposing sentence, the court must address
any victim of a the crime of violence or sexual abuse who is present
at sentencing and must permit the victim to speak or submit any
information about the sentence. Whether or not the victim is

273. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
274. Id.
275. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B).

903

A_CASSELL.FIN

10/24/2005 6:31 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2005

present, a victim’s right to address the court may be exercised by
the following persons if present:
(i) a parent or legal guardian, if the victim is younger than 18
years or is incompetent; or
(ii) one or more family members or relatives the court
designates, if the victim is deceased or incapacitated.

The Rationale:
As noted earlier,276 Rule 32 currently contains a definition of
“victim” that is narrower than the CVRA’s definition. The simplest
fix is simply to strike the definition of victim and victim’s
representative here and include an appropriate definition in Rule 1.
(New) Rule 43.1—Victim’s Right To Attend Trials
The Proposal:
A new rule implementing the victim’s right to be present at trials
and other proceedings should be added as follows:
Rule 43.1 Victim’s Presence
(a) Victim’s Right To Attend. A victim has the right to attend
any public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear
and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim
would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at
that proceeding. Before making any determination to exclude a
victim, the court shall make every effort to permit the fullest
attendance possible by the victim and shall consider reasonable
alternatives to the exclusion of the victim from the criminal
proceeding. The reasons for any decision to exclude a victim shall
be clearly stated on the record.
(b) Proceeding With and Without Notice. The court may
proceed with a public proceeding without a victim if proper notice
has been provided to that victim under Rule 10.1. The court may
proceed with a public proceeding (other than a trial or sentencing)

276. See discussion supra notes 120–27, 220–23 and accompanying text discussing Rules
1 and 32(a).
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without proper notice to a victim only if doing so is in the interest
of justice, the court provides prompt notice to that victim of the
court’s action and of the victim’s right to seek reconsideration of
the action if a victim’s right is affected, and the court ensures that
notice will be properly provided to that victim for all subsequent
public proceedings.
(c) Numerous Victims. If the court finds that the number of
victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the victims the right
to be present, the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to
facilitate victims’ attendance.
(d) Right To Be Heard on Victims’ Issues. In addition to rights
to be heard established elsewhere in these rules, at any public
proceeding at which a victim has the right to attend, the victim has
the right to be heard on any matter directly affecting a victim’s
right.

The Rationale:
The rules should reflect the CVRA’s command that victims have
the right to attend public proceedings in all but the most unusual
circumstances. The CVRA guarantees victims the right to attend a
proceeding “unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing
evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be
materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that
proceeding.”277 This is a fundamental right for victims. A crime is
often a very significant event in the life of a victim, and the trial, too,
may be extremely important. Victims deserve to see in person
whether justice is being done and should be exempted from the rule
requiring trial witnesses to sit outside the courtroom.278 The CVRA
adopts this approach by
allow[ing] crime victims, in the vast majority of cases, to attend the
hearings and trial of the case involving their victimization. This is
so important because crime victims share an interest with the

277. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
278. See generally PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 80
(1982) (urging that victims be able to attend trial); Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The
Victim’s Right To Attend the Trial: The Reascendant National Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 481 (2005) (developing this argument at length).
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government in seeing that justice is done in a criminal case and this
interest supports the idea that victims should not be excluded from
public criminal proceedings, whether these are pretrial, trial, or
post-trial proceedings.279

Most states have also adopted language affirming a victim’s right to
attend court proceedings, including the trial.280
One way of addressing the victim’s right to attend would be to
leave the matter to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule of
Evidence 615—the so-called “rule on witnesses”—requires exclusion
of witnesses with certain exceptions, including the fourth exception
for “a person authorized by statute to be present.”281 This exception
was added to cover crime victims,282 who had a right to attend trials
subject to certain conditions even before the passage of the CVRA.283
Without the explicit listing of this exception, some trial courts simply
overlooked the victim’s right to attend—most notoriously in the
Oklahoma City bombing trial.284

279. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
280. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A) (“To preserve and protect victims’ rights to
justice and due process, a victim of crime has a right: . . . [t]o be present at and, upon request,
to be informed of all criminal proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present.”);
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (“Any person who is a victim of a criminal act, or such person’s
designee, legal guardian, or surviving immediate family members if such person is deceased,
shall have the right to be heard when relevant, informed, and present at all critical stages of the
criminal justice process.” (emphasis added)); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (“A crime victim, as
defined by statute, has the following rights: . . . (4) to be present at all criminal justice
proceedings . . . .”) (emphasis added); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (“As defined by law, a victim of
crime shall have the right to . . . be present . . . during all critical stages of preconviction . . .
proceedings . . . .” (emphasis added)); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“Crime victims . . . shall
have the following rights . . . The right to attend trial and all other court proceedings the
accused has the right to attend.” (emphasis added)); MISS. CONST. ANN. art. III, § 26A
(2000) (“Victims of crime . . . shall have the right . . . to be present . . . when authorized by
law, during public hearings.” (emphasis added)); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32 (“Crime victims, as
defined by law, shall have the following rights . . . (1) the right to be present at all criminal
justice proceedings at which the defendant has such right . . . .” (emphasis added)); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-43-21 (2000) (“The victim has the right to be present throughout all
criminal proceedings as defined in Section 99-43-1.” (emphasis added)). See generally Beloof
& Cassell, supra note 278, (collecting all state statutes and rules pertaining to the victim’s right
to attend).
281. FED. R. EVID. 615(4).
282. See FED. R. EVID. 615, Adv. Comm. Notes, 1998 Amendments.
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (1990) (replaced by the CVRA).
284. See supra notes 35–58 and accompanying text; Beloof & Cassell, supra note 278, at
514–17.
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Merely relying on Rule 615 to protect the victim’s right to
attend proceedings, however, would be inadequate. First, the
defendant’s right to attend proceedings is deemed sufficiently
important to merit treatment in a specific rule in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure—Rule 43. This proposed victim’s rule, Rule
43.1, would even-handedly mirror that treatment for victims.
Second, Federal Rule of Evidence 615 does not comprehensively
address the victim’s right to attend proceedings. For starters, it
would seem that the Advisory Committee Notes in the Federal Rules
of Evidence now need a revision to reference the CVRA. Otherwise,
judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel might simply be unaware
that a victim is now “authorized by statute”—the CVRA—to be
present.285 Even if legal professionals realize the CVRA’s
ramifications, most crime victims are not lawyers and lack experience
in the criminal justice system. Therefore, their rights need to be laid
out in the most direct manner possible by listing their right to attend
any public court proceeding in the criminal rules.
Finally, providing the details of the victim’s right to attend is
important for practical reasons. The CVRA qualifies the victim’s
right to attend by requiring exclusion in those rare cases when the
victim’s testimony “would be materially altered if the victim heard
other testimony at that proceeding.”286 The CVRA, however,
contains additional procedural requirements that judges must follow
before excluding a victim in such situations: “Before making a
determination . . . [to exclude a victim], the court shall make every
effort to permit the fullest attendance possible by the victim and shall
consider reasonable alternatives to the exclusion of the victim from
the criminal proceeding.”287 Presumably, these reasonable
alternatives include having the victim testify first and then watching
all the following witnesses testify,288 something judges are authorized
to require.289 The Act also requires that “[t]he reasons for any
decision denying relief under this chapter shall be clearly stated on
285. The current Advisory Committee Notes reference the old Victims Rights Act, which
contains a narrower formulation of the victim’s right to attend than found in the CVRA. See
Beloof & Cassell, supra note 278, at 514–19.
286. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
287. Id. § 3771(b).
288. See Beloof & Cassell, supra note 278, at 540–43 (discussing this approach).
289. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (judge controls “order” of evidence).
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the record.”290 These procedural requirements are new and
potentially complex. Moreover, issues surrounding victim attendance
at criminal proceedings are likely to occur frequently. Victims can
appeal any exclusion order, and appellate courts must take up those
appeals expeditiously.291 Accordingly, it is important that lawyers,
judges, and victims have the new rule and its procedural
requirements at their fingertips, rather than being forced to dig it
out through some cross-reference to the United States Code. For all
these reasons, subsection (a) of the proposed rule simply tracks
verbatim the substantive and procedural requirements of the CVRA.
Proposed Rule 43.1(a) also limits the victim’s right to attend
“public” proceedings. It is clear that the CVRA intended to make no
change in the circumstances in which proceedings could be closed to
the public. As Senators Kyl and Feinstein explained in a colloquy
regarding the law: “[T]he Government or the defendant can request,
and the court can order, judicial proceedings to be closed under
existing laws. This provision [of the CVRA] is not intended to alter
those laws or their procedures in any way . . . .”292
Proposed Rule 43.1(b) turns to the potentially complex subject
of whether the court may go forward with a proceeding when the
victim is not present. Of course, if the victim has been properly
notified but has elected not to attend the proceeding, no problem
arises. The difficult issue is what to do when the victim is absent
because of lack of notice of the proceeding. It could be argued that
the court has no choice but to reschedule such a proceeding, just as
it would be required to reschedule a proceeding when the defendant
had not received notice. The CVRA mandates that courts “shall
ensure” that crime victims are accorded their rights,293 and one of
the rights is notice for court proceedings.294 If the victim has not
received notice of a proceeding, then going forward with the
proceeding arguably violates the victim’s rights under the CVRA. As
Senator Kyl explained:
290. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(b).
291. Id. § 3771(d)(3).
292. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (colloquy between Sen. Kyl and
Sen. Feinstein) (explaining that “[i]n this regard, it is not our intent to alter 28 C.F.R. Sec.
50.9 in any respect”).
293. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(b).
294. Id. § 3771(a)(2).
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It does not make sense to enact victims’ rights that are rendered
useless because the victim never knew of the proceeding at which
the right had to be asserted. Simply put, a failure to provide notice
of proceedings at which a right can be asserted is equivalent to a
violation of the right itself.295

Proposed Rule 43.1(b) stakes out a position more limited than
an absolute requirement of proper victim notification. Except for
trials and sentencings (which are discussed below), proposed Rule
43.1(b) would allow the court to move forward with a proceeding
without notice to the victim provided that three conditions are met:
(1) doing so is in the interests of justice, (2) the court provides
prompt notice to the victim of the court’s action and of the victim’s
right to seek reconsideration of the action if a victim’s right is
affected, and (3) the court ensures that notice will be properly
provided to the victim for all subsequent public proceedings.
Each of these three conditions serves an important purpose. To
begin with, the court should not go forward unless the interests of
justice are served—the first requirement. The court should also
notify the victim of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
court’s action if a victim’s right is affected—the second requirement.
For example, if the court holds a bail hearing without proper notice
to the victim and decides to release a defendant, the victim should be
advised of this fact and of the right to ask the court to reconsider
that bail decision. (The CVRA, as noted earlier, gives victims the
right to provide information regarding bail decisions.296) Finally, if
the court is moving forward without proper notice to a victim at a
particular proceeding, it seems only fair that the problem be solved
for future proceedings—the third requirement.
For two important proceedings—trial and sentencing—the
proposed rule would bar a court from moving forward without
proper notice to the victim. This is consistent with the CVRA’s
directive that “in any court proceeding involving an offense against a
crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded
the rights [in the CVRA].”297 If the victim has not been notified of a

295. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
296. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (discussed at supra notes 104–10 and accompanying
text).
297. Id. § 3771(b) (emphasis added).
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trial or sentencing, the only way the court can “ensure” that the
victim’s right is protected is to delay the trial or sentencing until the
victim receives notice. This is entirely appropriate; a victim of a crime
deserves the opportunity to see the trial of her victimizer and to
speak at sentencing. A modest delay in these proceedings is a small
price to pay for respecting the victim’s rights. Moreover, neither a
trial nor a sentencing can be repeated. Double jeopardy principles
may well forbid retrial even when a victim has received no notice,298
and the CVRA itself bars a new trial remedy.299 Sentencings would
appear to be subject to limitations that might prevent a crime victim
from obtaining a resentencing300—although the CVRA directly
allows for re-sentencings in certain limited circumstances.301
While neither trial nor sentencing could proceed without proper
notice to the victim, this restriction will affect only a small number of
cases for a short period of time. Many federal cases lack a specifically
identifiable victim (e.g., drug and immigration offenses) and thus are
not covered by the CVRA. In those cases with a victim, a significant
percentage of victims may waive any right to receive notice. In cases
where victims choose to receive notice, presumably the notice will be
properly given the vast majority of the time. Even apart from notice
requirements, most victims will be trial witnesses and therefore will
have been notified of the trial by a subpoena. Victims will also often
be aware of sentencings through the work of probation officers in
preparing presentence reports.302 In the tiny fraction of cases where
notice has not been properly provided, notice will often be only a

298. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’
Rights, supra note 16, at 303–04 (discussing double jeopardy barriers to remedying violations
of victim’s rights).
299. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5).
300. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(c) (correction of sentence allowed only for technical or
other clear error). Whether denial of a victim’s right constitutes “clear error” subject to
correction presumably will need to be resolved in future cases. Cf. United States v. Bedonie,
413 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2005) (remedying error in restitution award not permitted after
imposition of sentence).
301. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5) (authorizing a victim motion to “re-open a . . . sentence”
if the victim’s right to be heard was denied); see 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (discussing this provision). In light of these provisions, the
Advisory Committee may need to consider redrafting Rule 35 to allow reopening of sentences
imposed in violation of victims’ rights.
302. See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text (discussing probation officers
collecting victim information for presentence reports).
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telephone call away. While the burdens of delaying a trial or
sentencing are not trivial, Congress has determined that the victim’s
rights must take precedence. Proposed subsection (b) faithfully
implements that determination.
Subsection (c) of the proposed rule deals with the victim’s right
to attend in situations involving multiple victims. Congress has
recognized that in some cases, such as the Oklahoma City bombing
case, it is impossible to afford all victims the opportunity to attend
trials. Accordingly, the CVRA provides that where “the number of
crime victims makes it impracticable” to protect rights for all victims,
the court “shall fashion a reasonable procedure” to give effect to
victims’ interests.303 Possible procedures include closed-circuit
transmission of the proceedings to a ceremonial courtroom,
auditorium, or other facility that can accommodate many people. To
permit such transmission, an amendment to Rule 53 is proposed
below.304
Subsection (d) gives victims a general right to be heard on issues
“directly affecting” their rights. The CVRA specifically mandates that
victims have the right to be heard with regard to release of the
defendant, a plea, or a sentence.305 The right to be heard at these
hearings has been addressed elsewhere in these proposed rules,306 but
courts will sometimes consider other issues that directly affect
victims’ rights. For example, courts may consider whether to release
the address and telephone number of the victim to the defendant.307
It makes little sense for the court to decide this issue without hearing
from the victim, particularly since the CVRA gives victims the right
“to be reasonably protected from the accused.”308 Subsection (d)
would cover such situations by allowing victims who are present at a
hearing to be heard on issues “directly” affecting their rights.

303. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(2).
304. See infra notes 340–42 and accompanying text.
305. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (discussed at supra notes 104, 230 and accompanying
text).
306. See supra note 296 and accompanying text (bail hearings); supra note 110 and
accompanying text (plea hearings); supra note 275 and accompanying text (sentencing
hearings).
307. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text (discussing changes to Rule 12.1).
308. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(1).
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Rule 44.1—Discretionary Appointment of Counsel for Victim
The Proposal:
The court’s discretionary authority to appoint counsel for a
victim should be included in a new rule as follows:
Rule 44.1 Counsel for Victims.
When the interests of justice require, the court may appoint
counsel for a victim to assist the victim in exercising his or her
rights.

The Rationale:
An argument could be made that the CVRA guarantees crime
victims the right to appointed counsel. After all, the CVRA
guarantees victims the right to be “treated with fairness” and fairness
can be understood as embracing the assistance of counsel.309 But on
closer examination, it becomes clear that nothing in the CVRA
directly mandates counsel for victims. As Senator Kyl explained,
“This bill does not provide victims with a right to counsel but
recognizes that a victim may enlist counsel on their own.”310
While the CVRA does not require judges to appoint counsel for
victims, nothing in it prevents judges from doing so in appropriate
cases, particularly under prevailing case law demonstrating that
federal courts have inherent authority to make such appointments.
Because this authority may not be well known to judges (or to
victims), the authority should be clearly laid out in the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
A number of federal courts have recognized inherent judicial
authority to appoint lawyers for indigent litigants in both civil and
criminal cases.311 While these cases do not directly involve
309. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (discussing “fairness” to the
defendant as a reason for recognizing a right to appointed counsel).
310. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
311. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (holding, in a capital case, that
courts have the power to appoint counsel and that “[a]ttorneys are officers of the court, and
are bound to render service when required by such an appointment”); United States v. Bertoli,
994 F.2d 1002, 1015–18 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the court has inherent power to order
defendant’s retained law firm to remain as standby counsel at a criminal trial when defendant
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appointment of counsel for crime victims, their principles clearly
apply to victims. Illustrative of these decisions is the thoughtful
analysis by the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska in
Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co.312 Bothwell presented four grounds
for its holding that courts have inherent power to appoint attorneys
to represent indigent litigants:
1) courts possess the inherent power to bring to their assistance
those “instruments” necessary to ensure a “fair and just”
adjudicative process in individual cases; 2) in many, if not most,
cases, due to the adversarial nature of our system, lawyers are a
necessary component in ensuring such a “fair and just” process; 3)
to a significant degree, neither the private marketplace nor public
or charitable efforts provide indigent litigants with adequate access
to legal assistance; and 4) to that extent, such failure threatens the
reliability of the results of the adversarial process.313

These grounds readily apply to appointing attorneys for indigent
victims when important rights under the CVRA are at stake. Without

elects to represent himself pro se); United States v. Accetturo, 842 F.2d 1408, 1412–16 (3d
Cir. 1988) (holding that courts have inherent power to appoint counsel during a criminal trial
proceeding but that the power does not extend to appointing lawyers licensed in other states);
United States v. Bowe, 698 F.2d 560, 566–67 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that a court has
inherent authority to appoint counsel for an indigent witness who may incriminate herself
during testimony in a criminal case); Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1212–16 (8th
Cir. 1982) (upholding a state court judge’s appointment of pro bono counsel in criminal case as
constitutional although noting that forcing an attorney to advance his own funds may be
unconstitutional); Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1973) (noting that in civil
rights cases, “representation of indigents upon court order has been a traditional obligation of
the lawyer which he assumes when he becomes a member of the bar”); Dolan v. United States,
351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding, in a criminal case, that lawyers implicitly consent
to be appointed by courts pro bono when accepting a license to practice law); United States v.
Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635–36 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding, in a criminal case, that there is “an
obligation on the part of the legal profession to represent indigents upon court order, without
compensation”). But cf. Colbert v. Rickmon, 747 F. Supp. 518, 527 (W.D. Ark. 1990)
(holding that courts have no inherent power to order attorneys to represent indigent clients).
See generally Jerry L. Anderson, Court-Appointed Counsel: The Constitutionality of
Uncompensated Conscription, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1989) (discussing the trend
against requiring lawyers to take uncompensated court appointments); Bruce Andrew Green,
Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal
Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366 (1981) (discussing the constitutionality of pro bono court
appointments); Judy E. Zelin, Court Appointment of Attorney To Represent, Without
Compensation, Indigent in Civil Action, 52 A.L.R. 4th 1063 (1987 & Supp. 2004).
312. 912 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Neb. 1995).
313. Id. at 1229.
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an attorney to press her claims, a victim may be unable to obtain a
“fair and just” adjudicative process.314 Moreover, crime victim
representation appears to be a prime example of a situation where
“neither the private marketplace nor public or charitable efforts
provide indigent litigants with adequate access to legal assistance.”315
No financial incentive will drive lawyers to represent victims in
criminal cases.316 And while pro bono representation for victims is
expanding,317 it still falls far short of the needs of victims in the
federal system. The fourth and final requirement—that the failure of
attorneys to represent the indigent client threatens the reliability of
the system—is also present where rights under the CVRA are at
stake. Neither the prosecutor nor the defendant has a personal stake
in the victim’s rights, and, frequently, they will have other priorities
and interests that may even be adverse to the rights of the victim.318
Accordingly, courts have inherent authority to appoint counsel to
represent indigent victims and, indeed, may even be able to require

314. See generally John W. Gillis & Douglas Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim
Rights Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689,
692 (2002).
315. Bothwell, 912 F. Supp. at 1229.
316. See Gillis & Beloof, supra note 314, at 698–700.
317. See infra note 324 and accompanying text (discussing funding in the CVRA for the
National Crime Victims Law Institute and other legal clinics for victims).
318. See Gillis & Beloof, supra note 314, at 692.
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counsel to serve without compensation.319 The local rules of some
federal courts already explicitly recognize this power.320
In addition to this inherent authority, federal courts appear to
possess statutory authority to make such an appointment. Title 28
broadly permits the court in both civil and criminal cases to “request
an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”321
Moreover, at least one statute already directly authorizes federal
courts to appoint counsel for child victims in certain cases. Title 18
U.S.C. § 3509 provides, “The court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for a child who was a victim of, or a witness to, a crime involving
abuse or exploitation to protect the best interests of the child.”
Congress, however, has not yet provided funding for this particular
right.322 Finally, in unusual circumstances where a crime victim may
also face possible criminal charges of his or her own, the Criminal
Justice Act would authorize appointment of and payment for defense
counsel.323
Proposed Rule 44.1 would confirm the existing discretionary
power of the courts to appoint volunteer counsel. The rule is purely
discretionary (the court “may” appoint counsel) and is limited to
319. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307 & n.8 (1989) (leaving open the
question of whether federal courts possess the inherent authority to require counsel to provide
legal services to the poor). Several lower courts have concluded that appointment without
compensation is proper. See Bothwell, 912 F. Supp. at 1230–34 (counsel have a duty to serve
without compensation); Family Division Trial Lawyers of the Superior Court-D.C. v. Moultrie,
725 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting argument that pro bono appointment violates
the Thirteenth Amendment because attorneys can take steps to avoid the pro bono
appointments and holding that pro bono court appointments are not per se “takings,” as
accepting court ordered representation of indigents is a condition of receiving a law license,
but excessive burden could present takings problem); Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d
1211, 1211 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that pro bono service is a voluntary obligation undertaken
by attorneys when they apply for a license to practice law); Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077,
1079–80 (8th Cir. 1973) (no takings problem with appointment); United States v. Dillon,
346 F.2d 633, 635–36 (9th Cir. 1965) (no taking problems with appointment). But see State
ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 759–70 (Mo. 1985) (questioning power of courts to
appoint counsel without providing compensation).
320. See, e.g., D. UTAH CIV. R. 83-1.1(b)(3) (1997) (“Any attorney who is admitted to
the bar of this court must agree, as a condition of such admission, to engage in a reasonable
level of pro bono work when requested to do so by the court.”).
321. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
322. Memorandum from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to the
United States District Court Judges and the United States Magistrate Judges (March 19,
1991) (available from the Administrative Office).
323. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1).
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situations where the interests of justice require appointment. The
rule does not address payment for counsel, as this matter must be left
to subsequent appropriations from Congress. The court, however,
can ask for volunteer counsel to assist victims on a pro bono basis.
There is reason to expect that some attorneys will volunteer. Not
only are many attorneys willing to undertake pro bono
representation, but the CVRA itself authorizes millions of dollars in
funding for victim representation around the country. The
authorization includes support for the National Crime Victims Law
Institute at the Northwestern School of Law at Lewis and Clark
College to help establish eleven legal offices around the country
representing crime victims.324
Finally, it might be argued that it is unnecessary to address this
subject in a rule because the court’s inherent authority to appoint
counsel exists even without a rule. Both courts and victims, however,
will find it useful to have this authority spelled out in the criminal
rules to eliminate any lingering doubt. In addition, the CVRA
obliges prosecutors to eliminate any lingering doubt in the event of
any material conflict of interest between the prosecutor and the
victim by “advis[ing] the crime victim that the crime victim can seek
the advice of an attorney.”325 This requirement may frequently
require prosecutors to help victims obtain legal counsel. Accordingly,
a separate rule on this subject is appropriate.
For all these reasons, the rules should be amended to recognize
the court’s authority to appoint volunteer counsel to represent a
crime victim.

324. See 42 U.S.C. 10603(d) (2000); see also 150 CONG. REC. S4266 (daily ed. Apr. 22,
2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (noting appropriations for the National Crime Victims Law
Institution “to provide grants and assistance to lawyers to help victims of crime in court” with
funding sufficient to “provide for two new regional offices and nine specific clinics”). For more
information on NCVLI, see http://www.ncvli.org.
325. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(c)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
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Rule 46—Victims’ Right To Be Heard Regarding Defendant’s
Release from Custody
The Proposal:
Victims should be explicitly given the right to be heard regarding
the defendant’s release from custody as follows:
(k) Victims’ Right To Be Heard. A victim has the right to be
heard regarding any decision to release the defendant. The court
shall consider the views of victims in making any release decision,
including such decisions in petty cases. In a case where the court
finds that the number of victims makes it impracticable to accord
all of the victims the right to be heard in open court, the court shall
fashion a reasonable procedure to facilitate hearing from
representative victims.

The Rationale:
The CVRA guarantees victims the right “to be reasonably heard”
at “any public proceeding . . . involving release.”326 A similar right
already exists for victims of stalking offenses.327 This proposed rule
simply recognizes a victim’s right “to be reasonably heard” and
further directs the court to consider the victim’s input. The victim’s
right to be heard would be meaningless if the court did not consider
the victim’s views. Moreover, existing law appears to recognize that
the court should consider the victim’s concerns.328
Rule 48—Victims’ Views on Dismissal To Be Considered
The Proposal:
The court should be required to consider the views of victims in
deciding whether to grant a government motion to dismiss charges
as follows:

326. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4).
327. 18 U.S.C. § 2263.
328. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (court to consider whether release of the defendant
“will endanger the safety of any other person”).
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Rule 48. Dismissal
(a) By the Government. The government may, with leave of
court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint. The
government may not dismiss the prosecution during trial without
the defendant’s consent. In deciding whether to grant the
government’s motion to dismiss, the court shall consider the views
of any victims.

The Rationale:
This proposed change would implement a victim’s right to be
“treated with fairness” and to be heard at any proceeding “involving
release” of the defendant by requiring the court to consider the
views of the victim before granting a government motion to dismiss
a charge. The rule already requires leave of court before a dismissal
can be approved. In determining whether to grant leave, the court
should consider whether dismissal is “clearly contrary to manifest
public interest.”329 Among the relevant factors in making this public
interest determination is whether the prosecution’s motion to
dismiss is motivated by “animus towards the victim.”330 The
proposed rule would simply require the court to consider the views
of the victim in making this determination, leaving the weight to
afford those views up to the court.
Rule 50—Victims’ Right to Proceedings Free from
Unreasonable Delay
The Proposal:
A victim’s right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay
should be recognized as follows:
Rule 50. Prompt Disposition
(a) Scheduling Preference. Scheduling preference must be given
to criminal proceedings as far as practicable.

329. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975).
330. In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 787 (3d Cir. 2000).
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(b) Defendant’s Right Against Delay. The court shall assure that
the defendant’s right to a speedy trial is protected, as provided by
the Speedy Trial Act.
(c) Victim’s Right Against Delay. The court shall assure that a
victim’s right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay is
protected. A victim has the right to be heard regarding any motion
to continue any proceeding. If the court grants a motion to
continue over the objection of a victim, the court shall state its
reasons in the record.

The Rationale:
Under the CVRA, a victim has a right “to proceedings free from
unreasonable delay.”331 A number of states have similar provisions.332
331. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(7). Even before the adoption of the CVRA, child victims
had the right to a “speedy trial” in certain situations. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(j).
332. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4435 (2001) (“In any criminal proceeding in which
a continuance is requested, the court shall consider the victim’s views and the victim’s right to
a speedy trial.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1050(a) (2005) (stating policy of the California
legislation that “[e]xcessive continuances . . . cause substantial hardship to victims and other
witnesses . . . . It is therefore recognized that the people, the defendant, and the victims and
other witnesses have the right to an expeditious disposition . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
9423 (2001) (“In ruling on any motion or other request for a delay or continuance . . . the
court shall consider and give weight to any adverse impact such delay or continuance might
have on the well-being of any victim . . . .”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3.1(c) (West
2005) (“[V]ictim shall be notified of the date and time of hearing [on any motion for
continuance] and shall be provided an opportunity to address the court on the impact the
continuance may have on the victim’s well-being.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844 (1999)
(“When ruling on a defense motion for continuance, the court shall consider the impact on the
victim.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-19 (2000) (“[T]he court . . . should make every
reasonable effort to consider whether granting [a] continuance shall be prejudicial to the
victim.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-11.2 (2000) (“[T]he court shall consider any adverse
impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of the victim . . . .”); TENN.
CODE § 40-38-116(a) (2003) (“In any criminal proceeding in which a continuance is
requested, the court shall consider the victim’s views and the victim’s right to a speedy trial. If
the continuance is granted over the victim’s objection, the court shall state on the record the
reason for the continuance and the procedures that have been taken to avoid further delays.”);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-207 (2004) (“The court shall consider the victim’s interest and
circumstances when . . . granting or denying continuances.”).
Some states limit speedy trial rights to child victims. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-6
(2000) (“In ruling on any motion . . . for . . . continuance . . . the court shall consider and
give weight to any adverse impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of a
child victim or witness.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 5133 (2001) (same); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 19-110 (2004) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.510 (LexisNexis 1992) (same);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 642-a (2005) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-35-05 (2003) (same);
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The proposed rule would give effect to this right. Of course, in
some situations, delay is reasonable. In others, however, the court
should deny a motion to continue in order to wrap up the
proceedings and possibly bring closure to a victim. As Senator
Feinstein has explained,
This provision does not curtail the government’s need for
reasonable time to organize and prosecute its case. Nor is the
provision intended to infringe on the defendant’s due process right
to prepare a defense. Too often, however, delays in criminal
proceedings occur for the mere convenience of the parties and
those delays reach beyond the time needed for defendant’s due
process or the government’s need to prepare. The result of such
delays is that victims cannot begin to put the crime behind them
and they continue to be victimized. It is not right to hold crime
victims under the stress and pressure of future court proceedings
merely because it is convenient for the parties or the court.333

The proposed rule gives victims a right against unreasonable
delay in subsection (c). To ensure that defendants’ rights are
reasonably protected, a new subsection (b) is added recognizing
defendants’ rights in the Speedy Trial Act.334 The existing rule’s
direction to give scheduling preference to criminal cases would
remain in subsection (a).
The proposal also gives victims the right to be heard on any
continuance. This is consistent with the drafters’ intent, as at least
one court has already opined.335 As Senator Kyl stated, “This
provision [in the CVRA] should be interpreted so that any decision
to schedule, reschedule, or continue criminal cases should include
victim input through the victim’s assertion of the right to be free
from unreasonable delay.”336

WIS. STAT. § 971.105 (2005) (same). For general review of the victim’s right to a speedy trial,
see generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, at 383–91; Cassell, Balancing the
Scales of Justice, supra note 15, at 1406.
333. 150 CONG. REC. S4268–69 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
334. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174.
335. United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 334 n.14 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(recognizing victim’s “participatory right” with respect to delays in a criminal case).
336. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(emphasis added).
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The proposed rule also requires that the court state its reason for
granting any continuance. This requirement stems from a
recommendation from the President’s Task Force on Victims of
Crime, which noted “the inherent human tendency to postpone
matters, often for insufficient reason,” and accordingly
recommended that “reasons for any granted continuance . . . be
clearly stated on the record.”337 Several states have adopted similar
provisions.338
Rule 51—Claiming Error Regarding Victims’ Rights
The Proposal:
The procedures for a victim to assert error should be spelled out
in the rules as follows:
Rule 51. Preserving Claimed Error
(a) Exceptions Unnecessary. Exceptions to rulings or orders of
the court are unnecessary.
(b) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party or a victim may preserve
a claim of error by informing the court—when the court ruling or
order is made or sought—of the action the party wishes the court
to take, or the party’s objection to the court’s action and the
grounds for that objection. If a party or a victim does not have an
opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an
objection does not later prejudice that party. A ruling or order that
admits or excludes evidence is governed by Federal Rule of
Evidence 103.

The Rationale:
The CVRA authorizes victim appeals and includes procedures for
expedited handling of those appeals.339 The proposed rule would
337. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 76 (1982).
338. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4435(B) (2001) (courts required to “state on
the record the reason for [any] continuance”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-7(3)(b) (2004)
(court required to “enter in the record the specific reason for the continuance and the
procedures that have been taken to avoid further delays”).
339. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
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incorporate victims into the existing rule regarding preservation of
errors.
Rule 53—Closed-Circuit Transmission of Proceedings for Victims
The Proposal:
Closed-circuit transmission of court proceedings for victims
should be authorized as follows:
Rule 53. Courtroom
Prohibited

Photographing

and

Broadcasting

(a) General Rule. Except as otherwise provided by a statute or
these rules, the court must not permit the taking of photographs in
the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of
judicial proceedings from the courtroom.
(b) Closed-Circuit Transmission for Victims. In order to permit
victims of crime to watch criminal trial proceedings, the court may
authorize closed-circuit televising of the proceedings for viewing by
victims or other persons the court determines have a compelling
interest in doing so.

The Rationale:
The CVRA grants victims the right to attend trials, as noted
previously in connection with proposed Rule 43.1.340 At the same
time, however, the CVRA recognizes that in situations with
numerous victims, the court may have to craft “a reasonable
procedure” to protect victims’ rights.341 One such reasonable
procedure would appear to be closed-circuit transmission of court
proceedings to a facility sufficiently large to accommodate all the
victims. This was the procedure followed in the Oklahoma City
bombing case.342

340. See supra notes 277–308 and accompanying text.
341. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(2).
342. See Paul G. Cassell & Robert F. Hoyt, The Tale of Victims’ Rights, LEGAL TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1996, at 32; Jo Thomas, Trial to Be Shown in Oklahoma for Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1997, at A14.
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The proposed rule would authorize such transmission in
appropriate cases. The language for the proposed rule comes from
42 U.S.C. § 10608(a), which authorizes closed-circuit transmissions
“notwithstanding any provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to the contrary” in cases in which a proceeding has been
transferred more than 350 miles—as was the case with the Oklahoma
City bombing trial. In light of the CVRA’s mandate that the court
must always craft “a reasonable procedure” to protect the rights of
multiple victims, there is no compelling reason to tie the device to
such geographical circumstances. The proposed rule authorizes
courts to allow such transmissions in any appropriate case.
Rule 58—Victims and Petty Offenses
The Proposal:
Courts should hear from victims regarding sentences in petty
cases as follows:
Rule 58. Petty Offenses and Other Misdemeanors.
....
(3) Sentencing. The court must give the defendant an opportunity
to be heard in mitigation and then proceed immediately to
sentencing. The court must also give victims an opportunity to be
heard. The court may, however, postpone sentencing to allow the
probation service to investigate or to permit either party to submit
additional information.

The Rationale:
The CVRA gives a “victim” the right to be heard at sentencing.
The CVRA defines “victim” as including anyone who is directly and
proximately harmed by “a Federal offense.”343 The Act does not limit
those offenses to felonies or misdemeanors. Accordingly, a victim has
a right to be heard at sentencing for any petty offense, as would be
reflected in the proposed rule.

343. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(e).
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CONCLUSION
The CVRA commands that victims be made participants in the
federal criminal process and thus requires significant changes to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Article has provided one
possible and comprehensive way to implement that congressional
command with specific language and supporting analysis for each
change. Undoubtedly there are other ways of implementing the
CVRA. However, since the Advisory Committee will be making
many decisions about how to best change the rules, one concluding
thought may be worth highlighting.
Congress will be paying close attention to how courts protect the
rights of future victims. Indeed, the CVRA directs the Administrative
Office for the U.S. Courts to report each year the number of times
that victims have attempted to assert their rights and been denied the
requested relief.344 More generally, Congress views the new Act as an
important step to protecting crime victims—a “new and bolder
approach, than has ever been tried before in our Federal system.”345
Congress is eagerly awaiting the results of this approach. As Senator
Leahy warned, “Passage of this bill will necessitate careful oversight
of its implementation by Congress.”346 Victims’ advocates, too, will
be watching carefully. 347
In light of this thorough and ongoing interest, the judiciary
should not merely attempt a “quick fix” or minimalist approach to
implementing the CVRA, but should comprehensively protect crime
victims’ rights by changes in court rules. If Congress believes that
the federal rules fail to faithfully reflect crime victims’ concerns, it
can directly amend the rules. But such direct amendments may not
sufficiently attend to the needs of the judicial branch or others
involved in the criminal justice process. It is in that spirit of
eliminating any need for congressional intervention that this Article

344. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771, Historical and Statutory Notes (requiring the Administrative
Office of the courts to file an annual report with Congress concerning the number of times a
victim’s right is asserted and denied by federal courts).
345. 150 CONG. REC. S4263 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
346. Id. at S4271 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
347. United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that
victims’ advocates “will be watching to see how federal courts and prosecutors carry out the
new law’s mandate”).
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offers proposals to fully and faithfully implement the congressional
directive that victims be integrated into the criminal justice process.
In the final analysis, whether the courts or Congress redraft the
rules is less important than that the redrafting occur. As commanded
in the CVRA, crime victims are now participants in federal criminal
cases. That new reality must be reflected throughout the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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